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HOWEVER KINDLY INTENTIONED:
STRUCTURAL RACISM AND VOLUNTEER CASA
PROGRAMS
Amy Mulzer & Tara Urs†
“A Judge McClellan in Lansing had authority over me and all of my
brothers and sisters. We were ‘state children,’ court wards; he had
the full say-so over us. A white man in charge of a black man’s
children! Nothing but legal, modern slavery—however kindly
intentioned.”
The Autobiography of Malcolm X
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† Amy Mulzer is a Staff Attorney and Clinical Instructor of Law in the Disability
and Civil Rights Clinic, Brooklyn Law School. Many thanks to Annette Appell, Matt
Fraidin, Marty Guggenheim, Chris Gottlieb, Nora Hirozawa, Kim Pearson, Hannah
Roman, Jocelyn Simonson, Jane Spinak, and participants in both the 2016 Family Law
Scholars and Teachers conference and the CUNY Law Review Symposium for their
very helpful comments.
Tara Urs is an Attorney for The Defender Association Division of the King
County Department of Public Defense. This article is dedicated to my clients—you
know who you are.
23
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 15 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 15 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY102.txt unknown Seq: 2  1-FEB-17 11:25
24 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:23
system has, in recent years, generated a heated debate within the
relatively small world of child welfare policy and scholarship. This
paper is focused on that same question from a different angle.
Rather than examining the disproportionately bad outcomes ex-
perienced by Black and Native American children, this paper looks
at the system itself, and in particular, one central feature of child
welfare decision-making in many parts of the country: volunteer
child advocates. Volunteer child advocates, or “CASAs” (Court Ap-
pointed Special Advocates), are lay volunteer guardians ad litem
appointed by the family court to represent the “best interests” of
children who enter the child welfare system. This paper turns at-
tention away from discussions of the race and economic poverty of
the families most affected by the system, and instead looks at the
impact of the race and privilege of these volunteer child advocates
on child welfare decision-making.
Although CASA programs are a relatively new development,
emerging as an experiment of one judge in Seattle in the 1980s1
they are part of the larger historical story of child welfare. The
demographic make-up of CASA programs—mostly middle-class
white women over the age of 302—easily recalls the women who,
after the Civil War, played the primary role in establishing the
modern child welfare system.3 The ability of white women to speak
for the best interests of poor children of color, to advocate for
their removal from their families, and to receive deference and
praise from legal systems, comes to our modern legal system with
deep roots. Understanding the role of race, gender, and power in
forming the structure of the child welfare system explains in part
why our legal system so comfortably tolerates a volunteer advocate
whose role, in any other context, would not survive even a half-
hearted due process challenge. And a full picture of the racist un-
derpinnings of the modern child welfare system helps develop a
fuller view of CASA programs.
The term structural racism can call to mind invisible forces
that shape the world in a discriminatory way. But what is particu-
larly striking about the proliferation of volunteer CASA programs
is just how visible, and visibly racist, they are. When a CASA is ap-
1 See Jean Koh Peters, How Children are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings, in the
United States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations, and Areas
for Further Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 966, 1002 (2006).
2 CALIBER ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION: FINAL REPORT 2-3
(1999) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION], http://www.nccpr.org/
reports/casa.pdf [https://perma.cc/GMM6-WQBT].
3 See infra Part II. A-D.
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pointed to speak for a child in family court, the child’s parents lose
one of the most cherished responsibilities any person can have—
the power to decide what is best for their own children and speak
on their behalf. This power is not transferred to the child, but
rather to the CASA herself; once appointed, it is the CASA who
voices “the child’s” position, based on the CASA’s own assessment
of what the CASA thinks is best for the child.4 When that power—
not just the power to determine a child’s fate, but the power to
even speak one’s own opinion on the matter—is distributed away
from poor families and children of color and given to a group of
middle-class white volunteers, the racial bias in the system—the
structural racism—is not just clearly visible, but is actually given a
seat at the table in court for all to see.
And that power works real, tangible harms on families who
encounter the child welfare system. The simple act of having a
CASA assigned increases the chance that a parent’s rights to her
child will be terminated,5 an outcome that has been called the
“civil death penalty.”6
CASA programs have carved out a unique and in some ways
untouchable role in child welfare decision-making nationwide. Be-
cause CASAs are volunteers, by custom they receive gratitude for
their service. But the praise CASAs receive goes beyond mere po-
liteness. A recent edition of the National CASA Association’s news-
letter highlighted comments by family court judges about local
CASA volunteers.7 One judge, R. Michael Key, a former President
of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, wrote
that “on an average day,” CASAs “change for the good the lives of
children with whom they had no previous connection and, on
many extraordinary days, literally save children’s lives.”8 Another
former President of the National Council, Judge Leonard Edwards,
wrote that a CASA is “a gift, the gift of an important person in a
child’s life.”9
Yet the unexamined praise that CASAs receive deserves a more
thorough assessment. There is reason to question the power that
4 See infra Part I. C.
5 EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 43, 48. R
6 See, e.g., Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989) (“[T]ermination of a
parent’s rights to her child is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty . . . .”).
7 J. Dean Lewis, The Roles and Responsibilities of the CASA/GAL Volunteer From a Judi-
cial Perspective, NAT’L CASA ASS’N: JUDGES’ PAGE (Spring 2016), http://www.casafor
children.org/site/c.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.9371787/k.99BB/JPW16_3_Lewis.htm [https://
perma.cc/838M-SS5L].
8 Id.
9 Id.
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CASAs have been given to influence the course of children’s lives,
and even more reason to question the unhesitating acceptance of
this state of affairs by the majority of those working within the sys-
tem. Why does the legal system assume that a group of volun-
teers—mostly middle-class white women—will make better
decisions for a low-income child of color than her own family, com-
munity, or the child herself could make? What is it about CASAs
that makes them not only acceptable, but practically untouchable?
However kindly intentioned their work may be, this paper posits
that CASAs essentially give voice to white supremacy—the same
white supremacy that permeates the system as a whole and that
allows us to so easily accept the idea that children in the child wel-
fare system actually require the “gift” of a CASA, and do not al-
ready have an abundance of “important people” in their lives.
I. CHILD WELFARE AND THE ROLE OF THE CASA
A. Race, Class, and Child Welfare
By now, it is well known that the child welfare system dispro-
portionately touches the lives of families of color, particularly Black
and Native American families. The child welfare system separates
more children of color from their families and communities, keeps
them separated for longer periods of time, and more often perma-
nently ends those families by terminating disproportionately more
of their legal relationships.10 It is also well cataloged that, even
10 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-816, AFRICAN AMERICAN
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO HELP STATES RE-
DUCE THE PROPORTION IN CARE 7 (2007) (“The HHS National Incidence Study has
shown since the early 1980s that children of all races and ethnicities are equally likely
to be abused or neglected; however, African American children, and to some extent
other minority children, have been significantly more likely to be represented in fos-
ter care, according to HHS data and other research.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-05-290, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLE-
MENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES 1
(2005) (reporting that in 2003, American Indian children represented about 3% of
the total number of children in foster care in the United States but only 1.8% of total
population under 18); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002) (describing and assessing the disproportionate representation of
Black children in the foster care system); Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American
Foster Care: The National Debate, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 215, 223-25 (2013) (discussing the
disproportionate representation of African American and Native American children
in the foster care system); Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal
Redress for African-American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 110 (2008) (“There have been a disproportionate number of
African-American children in the child welfare system for the last several decades. . . .
Although African-American children make up 15% of the children in this country,
they comprise 37% of the children in the child welfare system. . . . There is wide-
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more than race and Tribal affiliation, poverty is the single greatest
predictor of a child welfare case.11 The child welfare system is fully
focused on the lives of poor families, and especially focused on
poor families of color. The flip side is that families with financial
means and white families are far more likely to be left alone by the
system despite experiencing the very same concerns that lead to
child welfare intervention for low-income families of color, such as
mental illness, alcoholism, recreational or habitual drug use, or do-
mestic violence.12 People of means are less likely to be touched by
the system or to know people touched by the system.
In the literature, a variety of reasons for this disproportionality
have been proposed, ranging from poorly substantiated claims that
poor families and families of color actually mistreat their children
at a higher rate13 to detailed accounts of the structural racism un-
spread agreement that compared to white children and families in the child welfare
system, children of color and their families have less access to services and their out-
comes are poorer.”). Cf. Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel
Foster System, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/
10/25/141662357/incentives-and-cultural-bias-fuel-foster-system [https://perma.cc/
68YL-53QT] (reporting the results of National Public Radio’s yearlong investigation
into cultural bias and disproportionate removal rates in South Dakota’s foster care
system).
11 “Poverty is the leading reason children end up in foster care. Studies show that
families earning incomes below $15,000 per year are twenty-two times more likely to
be involved in the child protective system than families with incomes above $30,000.
Lindsey concludes not only that ‘inadequacy of income, more than any other factor,
constitutes the reason that children are removed,’ but that ‘inadequacy of income
increased the odds for placement by more than 120 times.’” MARTIN GUGGENHEIM,
WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 192-93 (2005) (quoting DUNCAN LINDSEY,
THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 65-66 (1994)).
12 “Poor parents often cannot afford to pay others to care for their children when
they are unable to because they have to go to work, they are distraught, or they are
high on drugs or alcohol. Nor can they afford to pay professionals to cover up their
mistakes. They cannot buy services to mitigate the effects of their own neglectful be-
havior. Affluent substance-abusing parents, for example, can check themselves into a
private residential drug treatment program and hire a nanny to care for their chil-
dren during their absence. The state never has to get involved.” ROBERTS, supra note
10, at 36. See also Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender,
Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 588 (1997)
(footnotes omitted) (“[S]tudies have shown that although African American and
white women of all income levels use drugs and alcohol at similar rates (with higher
rates for white women), African American women are drug tested during delivery
more often than white women, and when both are tested, black women are reported
to child welfare authorities for prenatal drug use at a significantly higher rate than
their white sisters.”); Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use
During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1205 (1990) (explaining that private obstetricians and hospi-
tals may be less likely to diagnose prenatal drug use “for fear of adverse patient reac-
tions and the loss of future referrals”).
13 See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare:
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derlying both the system as a whole and individual decisions within
it.14 As many have noted, not only are families of means able to
access private resources to address personal and familial crises that
might otherwise result in intervention by the child welfare system,
but they are also under significantly less day-to-day scrutiny.15
While some families of means might send their children to public
school, they do not apply for public benefits, live in public shelters,
or rely on public health clinics, allowing them to keep their private
lives truly private. They are disproportionately less likely to be
stopped by the police and, if stopped, less likely to be arrested.
Low-income families and families of color have lives that are signifi-
cantly more entangled with the state, through no choice of their
own, and every interaction between a poor family and the myriad
of state systems with which they come into contact on a day-to-day
basis is another opportunity for someone to make a call to child
protective services.16 This issue has only been exacerbated by the
False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 874 (2009) (“Black parents
are disproportionately characterized by risk factors for maltreatment, such as extreme
poverty, serious substance abuse, and single parenting; therefore, there is good rea-
son to believe that black parents actually commit maltreatment at higher rates than
whites.”).
14 See, e.g., ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE
STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE (1972); KEESHA DUNBAR &
RICHARD P. BARTH, CASEY-CSSP ALLIANCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY IN CHILD WELFARE, RA-
CIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY, RACE DISPARITY, AND OTHER RACE-RELATED FINDINGS IN PUB-
LISHED WORKS DERIVED FROM THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-
BEING (2007); ROBERTS, supra note 10; Sandra T. Azar & Phillip Atiba Goff, Can Science
Help Solomon? Child Maltreatment Cases and the Potential for Racial and Ethnic Bias in
Decision Making, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 533 (2007); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare
and Civil Rights, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
at the University of Illinois College of Law (Oct. 2, 2001), in 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171
(2003); Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Prison].
15 The Supreme Court has spoken approvingly of just this sort of disproportionate
scrutiny of low-income families, rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to New
York’s system of mandatory home visits for welfare recipients in part because such a
visit allowed the case worker to check on the children residing in the home. Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-19, 322-23 (1971). Unsurprisingly, this line of reasoning pro-
voked a sharp dissent from Justice Marshall: “Would the majority sanction, in the
absence of probable cause, compulsory visits to all American homes for the purpose
of discovering child abuse? Or is this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitu-
tional law that a mother, merely because she is poor, is substantially more likely to
injure or exploit her children?” Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16 “The mothers and children ‘served’ by the public protective system are over-
whelmingly poor and disproportionately of color. Poor families are more susceptible
to state intervention because they lack power and resources and because they are
more directly involved with governmental agencies. For example, the state must have
probable cause to enter the homes of most Americans, yet women receiving aid to
families with dependent children (AFDC) are not entitled to such privacy. In addition
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widespread passage of broad mandatory reporting statutes that re-
quire a wide—and growing—range of professionals to report any
suspicion of child abuse or neglect.17
That said, the disproportionate scrutiny placed upon certain
families in our society is not, in and of itself, enough to explain the
wildly different levels of involvement with the child welfare system.
Just as important is the discretion embedded in every stage of the
child welfare system, from the initial decision that the presenting
situation requires a call to child protective services to the determi-
nation that there was, in fact, neglect to the assessment that it is in
the best interests of a particular child to remain in the care of and
eventually be adopted by her foster family.18 While the peculiar set-
up of dependency court—the low standard of proof, lack of proce-
dural protections, and ambiguous substantive standards, discussed
below—may not be the direct or only cause of the disproportionate
impact borne by low-income families and families of color, these
factors are what allow it to occur. Working in an ambiguous, com-
paratively informal setting where the stakes are high and the per-
ceived risk of getting it wrong is enormous, including responsibility
for the death of a child,19 decision-makers—from mandated re-
porters to child protective workers to the agency attorneys who
to receiving direct public benefits (like AFDC and Medicaid), poor families lead more
public lives than their middle-class counterparts: rather than visiting private doctors,
poor families are likely to attend public clinics and emergency rooms for routine
medical care; rather than hiring contractors to fix their homes, poor families encoun-
ter public building inspectors; rather than using their cars to run errands, poor
mothers use public transportation.” Appell, supra note 12, at 584 (footnotes omitted).
17 Every state has a statute that requires members of certain professions and other
specified individuals to report suspected abuse or neglect. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW §§ 413-414 (McKinney 2015) (requiring members of nearly fifty specified profes-
sions—including alcohol and substance abuse counselors, dental hygienists, and assis-
tant district attorneys—to report suspected abuse or neglect); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 6311-6312 (2015) (requiring medical professionals, medical examiners and funeral
directors, school employees, child-care workers, religious leaders, social services work-
ers, law enforcement officers, employees at public libraries, independent contractors,
attorneys affiliated with organizations serving children, and foster parents to report
suspected abuse or neglect). For a discussion of the development and expansion of
mandatory reporting requirements and the resulting bias towards over-reporting and
over-labeling of child abuse and neglect, see, for example, GUGGENHEIM, supra note
11, at 193-94; Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse
and Society’s Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819 (2010); Gary B. Melton, Mandated
Reporting: A Policy Without Reason, 29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 9 (2005).
18 See ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 55-59 (describing the degree of discretionary deci-
sion-making involved in the initial stages of a child protective proceeding).
19 For a detailed and eloquent description of the peculiar combination of ambigu-
ity, informality, and life-or-death pressure involved in child welfare decision-making,
see Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive Biases,
and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 928-35 (2013).
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screen cases and draft petitions to the judges themselves—are rela-
tively free to rely on their own opinions about what situations re-
quire intervention, complete with their own conscious or
unconscious biases.20
The next sub-section will describe the life of a typical child
protective case, both as foundation for readers who are not familiar
with the system and to highlight the degree of discretion present
throughout.
B. Life of a Child Protective Case
Not all child protective investigations result in court involve-
ment. When an agency receives a report of suspected abuse or neg-
lect, it assigns a social worker (or case manager) to investigate the
allegation and determine whether there is any possible basis for
concluding that abuse or neglect has occurred.21 Even if the inves-
tigating worker determines that a child has been harmed or is at
risk of harm, the agency may leave the children in the home and
provide services to the family to ameliorate the problem. So long as
the family “voluntarily” accepts the services and does what the
agency asks, the agency may not need to file a petition with the
family court.22 However, if the agency wants to require the family
20 Dorothy Roberts describes a training exercise carried out by the National Child
Welfare Leadership Center that asked a group of caseworkers to make decisions
about “the level of risk and agency intervention required after reading descriptions of
possible child maltreatment in a series of vignettes.” ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 52.
Half of the vignettes involve families of color, and half involve white families; the
participants are not told that there are two sets of vignettes, and in each set the race of
the characters is “reversed and counterbalanced to reduce experimental error.” Id. As
Roberts explains, the exercise “always uncovers the participants’ racial biases. ‘With-
out exception, the results of the exercise conducted in all sessions revealed that deci-
sions about the level of risk and intervention were influenced by the race of the child
and family described in the vignette, independent of all other factors[.]’” Id.
21 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(6)(a) (McKinney 2015). The standard for
this initial investigation is often quite low: in order to “indicate” a report of suspected
abuse or neglect in New York State, the investigating agency need only find “some
credible evidence” to support the report. Id. § 422(5)(a). A few jurisdictions, includ-
ing Washington, have a slightly higher standard. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020(11)
(2013) (defining “founded” as “the determination following an investigation by the
department that, based on available information, it is more likely than not that child
abuse or neglect did occur”).
22 Of course, many “voluntary” agreements are not in fact voluntary, as the parent
knows that if they refuse, the agency can and likely will file a petition in court. By
using the threat of family court, child welfare workers can save the hassle of actually
going to court—and may even get parents to agree to do services or accept other
restrictions that the family court would not actually order—by convincing parents to
sign a voluntary agreement. See, e.g., Soledad A. McGrath, Differential Response in Child
Protection Services: Perpetuating the Illusion of Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 629, 663-
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to engage in services, thinks the family is not sufficiently “coopera-
tive,” or seeks to remove the child from the home, it will bring the
case into court by means of a petition alleging neglect or abuse.23
Once a child protective case enters family court, it proceeds
on multiple tracks at the same time. If the agency seeks to remove
the child from her parents’ care, the family is entitled to a separate
hearing regarding the necessity of the removal—variously called a
“shelter care hearing,” “72-hour hearing,” or, in New York, a “1027
hearing,” among other things.24 Accordingly, during the pendency
of the child welfare case, the child who is the subject of the case
may remain in her own home, in the care of her parents, or she
may be removed and temporarily placed in foster care with a rela-
tive or with strangers.25
The family is also entitled to a full trial on the merits of the
abuse or neglect allegations, which progresses much like any other
civil case. The first step is fact-finding,26 where the court will either
dismiss the petition or, more commonly, enter a finding of abuse
or neglect against the parents. The court then enters an order of
79 (2012); Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’ Fictional
Voluntary Separation Decision and A Proposal for Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 835 (1998); see
also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977)
(internal citations omitted) (“The extent to which supposedly ‘voluntary’ placements
are in fact voluntary has been questioned on other grounds as well. For example, it
has been said that many ‘voluntary’ placements are in fact coerced by threat of neg-
lect proceedings and are not in fact voluntary in the sense of the product of an in-
formed consent.”).
23 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(11) (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.040(1) (2011).
24 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1027 (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 13.34.060-.065 (2013). There are exceptions to the hearing requirement: workers
in New York, for example, may seek an ex parte removal order when there is “not
enough time to file a petition and hold a preliminary hearing,” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1022(a)(i)(C) (McKinney 2005), or may remove a child without going to court at all
where there is “reasonable cause to believe that the child is in such circumstance or
condition that his or her continuing in said place of residence or in the care and
custody of the parent or person legally responsible for the child’s care presents an
imminent danger to the child’s life or health” and “there is not time enough to apply
for an [ex parte] order,” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1024(a)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 2009). Like
the provision for voluntary placement, these exceptions are susceptible to abuse and
have, at times, been applied so broadly as to swallow the rule. See Nicholson v. Wil-
liams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (evidence demonstrated that New
York City’s Administration for Children’s Services had an “agency-wide practice of
removing children from their mother without evidence of a mother’s neglect and
without seeking prior judicial approval”).
25 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(b)(i)(A)-(C) (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.34.060 (2007).
26 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1051 (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.110 (2007).
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disposition, indicating what services the parents must complete to
correct the issues on which the finding of abuse or neglect was
based.27 The dispositional order will also indicate where the child
should live pending full resolution of the case: the child may re-
main in or return to her parents’ care under supervision from the
agency, or she may be placed out of home on an ongoing basis.28
While the issue at fact-finding is whether the agency has estab-
lished that the parents abused or neglected the child as alleged,29
the issue at disposition is what result would be in the child’s best
interests.30
If the child has been removed from her parents’ care, there
will also be a series of federally-mandated “permanency hearings”
at six-month intervals to address the family and agency’s progress
towards reunification and, theoretically, to determine if the child
can return home.31 Ultimately, if the family is not successfully re-
united, the agency will move to establish some other form of “per-
manency” for the child, usually through termination of the
parents’ rights and placement of the child for adoption.32 The
agency will file a petition seeking termination of the parents’ rights
to their child; the parents have the right to a full trial and a disposi-
tional hearing on this petition as well.33 As with the original peti-
tion alleging abuse or neglect, the issue at the termination trial will
be whether the agency has established sufficient grounds for termi-
nation, while the issue at the disposition is what is in the child’s
best interests.34
27 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1052 (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.130 (2013).
28 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1052(a)(i)-(vii) (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.34.130(1)(a)-(b) (2013).
29 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1051(a) (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.110(1) (2007) (“The petitioner shall have the burden of establishing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the child is dependent within the meaning of RCW
13.34.030.”).
30 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1052 (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.130(3) (2013) (“The department or supervising agency may only place a child
with a person not related to the child as defined in RCW 74.15.020(2)(a), including a
placement provided for in subsection (1)(b)(iii) of this section, when the court finds
that such placement is in the best interest of the child.”).
31 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2015); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089 (McKinney 2016);
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.145(1) (2015).
32 Under 1997’s Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), state agencies must file a
petition to terminate the rights of parents whose child has been in care for fifteen of
the previous twenty-two months, unless the court finds good cause exists not to file
such a petition. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2016).
33 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.132 (2013).
34 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
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Finally, in addition to everything occurring in court, there are
various out-of-court obligations: visitation for parents separated
from their children, service planning meetings, evaluations, service
review meetings, and participation in the services themselves, rang-
ing from once-a-week evening parenting classes to all day, full-time
drug treatment and mental health services.35 While a family cannot
be ordered to participate in any services or work with the agency
prior to the court making a finding of abuse or neglect, parents
can agree to participate in services, even without a finding of abuse
or neglect, as part of an agreement to keep or bring their child
home or to improve the likelihood of a favorable resolution.36 The
reality of child welfare proceedings is that a parent’s participation
in recommended services, “cooperation,” and “compliance”—or
the caseworker’s assessment thereof—are often the key to every-
thing else: visitation, reunification, and a favorable settlement.37
The reason that the agency has to bring the case into court if it
seeks more than voluntary engagement with services is, of course,
because parents have a fundamental constitutional right to make
decisions about the care and custody of their children.38 The fun-
damental right to family integrity has the strongest, most continu-
ous presence in our constitutional tradition of any non-
§ 13.34.132 (2013). Although the Washington Statute does not define the “best inter-
ests” inquiry as a dispositional issue, case law has made clear that it is a separate in-
quiry from whether the statutory termination elements have been met. In re Welfare
of A.B., 232 P.3d 1104, 1113 (Wash. 2010) (describing the “best interests” inquiry as
the second step in a two-step process).
35 This is the experience of the authors, who have represented parents in New
York City and Seattle, as well as others familiar with the child welfare system. See, e.g.,
Appell, supra note 12, at 583; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 11, at 206-07; see also WASH.
DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., CHILDREN’S ADMIN., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GUIDE,
§§ 1710, 1720 (2016) (describing, respectively, “Shared Planning Meetings” and
“Family Team Decision Making Meetings”).
36 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.065(4)(j) (2013) (“At the shelter care hearing
the court shall . . . inquire into . . . . [w]hether any orders for examinations, evalua-
tions, or immediate services are needed. The court may not order a parent to un-
dergo examinations, evaluation, or services at the shelter care hearing unless the
parent agrees to the examination, evaluation, or service . . . .”).
37 For a valuable discussion of this phenomenon and the problems with it, see Amy
Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings,
11 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 339, 343-55 (1999). See also Appell, supra note 12, at 598
(describing the “elevation of form over substance” in the system’s emphasis on “coop-
eration” and “compliance” as a measure of good parenting).
38 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
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enumerated right.39 Parents are ordinarily assumed to act in their
children’s best interests, and are permitted to make a wide range
of decisions on behalf of their children, even if others might disa-
gree with their choices.40 In the context of a child welfare proceed-
ing, the ostensible role of the family court is to ensure that this
fundamental right is respected, and that the state only intrudes
into the private sphere of the family when absolutely necessary.
Nevertheless, in child welfare cases the burden of proof is
low—at fact-finding, only a preponderance of the evidence, or fifty-
one percent certainty—and procedural protections are largely ab-
sent.41 For example, there is no right to a trial by jury,42 no right to
a speedy trial, and while many states have established a statutory
right to counsel for parents in child welfare proceedings,43 there is
no federal constitutional right to an attorney or to effective assis-
tance of counsel.44 At fact-finding, some states allow broad excep-
tions to the hearsay rule for, among other things, out-of-court
39 “The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental lib-
erty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
40 “A parent has a constitutional right to direct his/ her child’s care and upbring-
ing, absent proof that the parent is abusing or neglecting the child . . . . Parental
rights doctrine protects parental decisions by presuming that parental choices regard-
ing or affecting children are sound. . . . The constitutional liberty interest . . . in the
parent-child relationship cabins the state’s ability to legislate regarding child welfare
and child rearing. Thus, the state can coercively intervene in, or interfere with, family
governance in order to protect the child, i.e., if the parents have fallen below mini-
mum parenting standards. The state, however, cannot intervene merely because it has
a difference of opinion with the parent about what is best for the child.” Annette Ruth
Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 683,
703-04 (2001).
41 The evidentiary standard is higher for termination trials—“clear and convincing
evidence” at the least, “beyond a reasonable doubt” for proceedings covered by
ICWA—but by the time the family’s case gets to the point of termination, the damage
resulting from the prior lack of procedural protections has already been done. See
generally Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in
Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457 (2003); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the
Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases Between Disposition and Permanency, 10
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13 (2010) (describing the almost complete lack of procedural
protections between the initial fact-finding and the termination trial, and the effect of
this lack of protections on families’ ability to successfully reunify).
42 See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Child Neglect,
Child Abuse, or Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 102 A.L.R.5th 227 (2002).
43 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.062(2)(b)
(2009).
44 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (finding no constitu-
tional right to the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental sta-
tus termination proceeding and that trial courts should make this determination on a
case-by-case basis).
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statements by children.45 Hearsay is generally admissible at disposi-
tion and at pre-trial hearings regarding the possible removal of
children.46 The substantive legal standards are frequently vague
and subject to wildly varying interpretations, permitting interven-
tion “when a child has been ‘abused’ or ‘neglected,’ and some-
times when the child is ‘at risk’ of abuse or neglect.”47
Moreover, by the time a family appears in court, its members’
right to family integrity—the very right the dependency court is
supposed to protect—has already been compromised.48 In some
cases, the child already may have been physically removed from
her parents’ care on an emergency basis without a court order, or
upon an ex parte application to the court.49 And even in those
cases where the state waits to physically remove the child, or never
removes the child at all, the mere existence of a child protective
proceeding divides the child’s interests from the interests of the
parents. Even before any finding of maltreatment has been made,
the constitutional assumptions described above are turned on their
head, and the child’s parents are no longer presumed to be able to
speak for the child or, often, to provide any valuable information
about her at all.50
Instead, in many jurisdictions, the child is appointed someone
45 See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 4007(2) (2013) (making hearsay statements of chil-
dren admissible in child-protection and parental-termination proceedings); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vi) (McKinney 2009) (making hearsay statements of children ad-
missible in fact-finding hearings regarding alleged neglect or abuse, though the state-
ments must be corroborated to be sufficient to make a finding of abuse or neglect).
46 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(c) (McKinney 2009); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.065(2)(c) (2013).
47 Appell, supra note 12, at 604-05 (“In their exact language, these statutes permit
protective intervention when a child has been ‘abused’ or ‘neglected,’ and sometimes
when the child is ‘at risk’ of abuse or neglect. These grounds are imprecise and diffi-
cult to apply. Neglect and risk of harm are particularly nebulous and subjective con-
cepts. The lack of clarity leaves the state without sufficient guidance as to the reason
for and scope of its involvement and results in needless disruption of families.”).
48 See Chill, supra note 41, at 460-61 (discussing the propensity of interim decisions
of any kind to become self-reinforcing and focusing on the powerful influence that an
initial removal exerts on subsequent child protective proceedings).
49 See sources cited supra note 24.
50 See, e.g., Christine Gottlieb, Children’s Attorneys’ Obligation to Turn to Parents to
Assess Best Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 1263, 1263-64 (2006). This would seem to go against the
underlying reasoning of the Court’s decision in Santosky, where the Court held that
the child’s interests and those of the child’s parents are presumed to coincide until
the parents’ conduct has been proven deficient. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
760 (1982) (“At the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents
are adversaries. . . . [U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his
parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship.”).
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else to speak for her—a stranger who will be treated as her advo-
cate throughout the length of the proceeding. Although parents
have no federal constitutional or statutory right to an attorney to
represent them in child welfare proceedings,51 certain federal
funding for state child protective services is contingent upon states’
compliance with a statutory requirement to appoint a “guardian ad
litem or court-appointed special advocate” to represent the child’s
interests.52
The titles used for these advocates vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction—in addition to guardians ad litem and CASAs, there
are children’s attorneys, “law guardians,” and VGALs (voluntary
guardians ad litem).53 More significantly, the role of the child’s ad-
vocate is unclear and varies from state to state, court to court, and
case to case.54 In some jurisdictions, children are appointed an at-
torney who is supposed to advocate for or at least express the
child’s stated position before the court. In other jurisdictions, chil-
dren are instead represented by an attorney or other individual
who is supposed to advocate for whatever result the advocate con-
cludes is in the child’s best interests; these advocates may or may
not be required to inform the court of the child’s stated position if
it differs from the advocate’s.55 And of course, what the attorneys
or advocates actually do in any given case may or may not line up
with what they are supposed to be doing; individual courts, offices,
and even courtrooms have their own cultures and accepted
practices.56
There are a number of issues with the entire concept of ap-
pointing advocates—of whatever form—to speak for children in
51 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2016); see infra notes 59-62 and accompanying
text.
53 See Peters, supra note 1, at 1001 (describing the range of titles and roles for R
advocates for children in child protective proceedings in the U.S.).
54 Even though lawyers (and other representatives such as guardians ad litem)
have been representing children in child protective proceedings for more than
twenty-five years and are currently serving that function in every jurisdiction in the
United States, there is no uniform definition of a lawyer’s role and responsibilities in
this context. As a result, lawyers have been remarkably free—or remarkably bur-
dened—to figure this out for themselves. Even worse, “in almost any state . . . one will
encounter within the state a deep disagreement about one’s role.” Martin Guggen-
heim, Counseling Counsel for Children, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1488, 1488 (1999) (reviewing
JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHI-
CAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (1997)); see also Peters, supra note 1, at 1011-14 R
(describing and attempting to systematically categorize the various roles assigned to
advocates for children in child welfare proceedings in the U.S.).
55 Peters, supra note 1, at 1011-14. R
56 Id. at 1013.
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child welfare proceedings, and there is an extensive literature ad-
dressing these issues.57 While some of the concerns raised in this
article may be applicable to other forms of child advocacy, the arti-
cle is focused on the use of volunteer CASAs as the child’s primary
“voice” in the court case. As is discussed below, CASAs, unlike chil-
dren’s attorneys, are often themselves a party to the child protec-
tive case, with counsel, notice, and a right to be heard. And unlike
children’s attorneys, CASAs are not professionals with enforceable
standards for their conduct. While many CASAs may feel a moral
duty to the children for whom they speak, they owe them no pro-
fessional, fiduciary, or other obligation. Yet CASAs have outsized
influence with the court: in great part because they are volunteers,
performing charitable good deeds, CASAs are treated with defer-
ence, and the court gives the opinion of the CASA extra weight.
CASAs’ “benevolence” has so far served as a buffer or a smokes-
creen, limiting questions about the impact CASA programs actually
have on the fairness of child welfare proceedings.58
The next sub-section explores the creation and rise of the
CASA as a particular form of child advocacy in child welfare
proceedings.
C. Court Appointed Special Advocates
The first CASA program in the country was established in 1979
by King County Superior Court judge David W. Soukup as a local
experiment.59 The CASA program quickly “became a significant
57 See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573 (2008); Annette
R. Appell, Children’s Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the Twenty-First Century, 6
NEV. L.J. 692 (2006); Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6
NEV. L.J. 805 (2006); Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children
in Custody, Visitation and Child Protective Proceedings, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 299 (1998);
Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1399 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but Not Heard:
Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984) [hereinafter
Represented But Not Heard].
58 Justice Brandeis famously took the opposite view when he said, “[t]he greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting). Less famous but equally apt was the opinion of the Second Circuit
in Duchesne v. Sugarman, noting that “of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for
the good of its victims may be the most oppressive . . . . Those who torment us for our
own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own
conscience.” Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 n.24 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting
C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 228
(1953)).
59 Peters, supra note 1, at 1002. R
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force within the child advocate community.”60 Soukup’s “local ex-
periment” led to the creation, in 1982, of a national CASA organi-
zation. In 1996, the national organization “successfully lobbied for
the inclusion of court appointed special advocates by name in the
amendment to [the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act],”61 so the statute, which used to mandate only that states ap-
point a guardian ad litem to represent children involved in child
welfare proceedings, now specifies that states must appoint a
“guardian ad litem . . . , who may be an attorney or a court ap-
pointed special advocate.”62 Currently, there are roughly 950 CASA
programs in 49 states and over 70,000 individual CASA
volunteers.63
The concept behind Soukup’s initial experiment—and be-
hind the hundreds of CASA programs currently operating across
the country—is that lay volunteers can adequately represent the
best interests of children in the child welfare system. Soukup’s un-
derlying concern, as he described it, was information—he felt that
he simply did not have enough information about the children in
his courtroom to make fully informed decisions.64 To address this,
Soukup began to use lay community volunteers as guardians ad li-
tem who could investigate the children’s circumstances and make
recommendations regarding what result was in their best interests.
The volunteers were supervised by a social worker and represented
by legal counsel in court proceedings.65
There are a number of variations in the way that CASA pro-
grams operate. In some CASA programs, like the one in King
County, Washington, the CASAs are a separate party to the child
welfare case, serving as guardians ad litem, with their own legal
representation.66 In other programs, CASAs merely supplement
the work of children’s attorneys, who either represent children di-
rectly or serve as guardians ad litem.67 For the purposes of this arti-
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996
(CAPTA), Pub. L. No. 104-235, 110 Stat. 3063 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii)).
63 About Us, NAT’L CASA ASS’N, http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/c.mtJSJ7MPI
sE/b.5301303/k.6FB1/About_Us__CASA_for_Children.htm [https://perma.cc/
2DYF-VYF9] (last visited May 2, 2016).
64 Michael S. Piraino, Lay Representation of Abused and Neglected Children: Variations
on Court Appointed Special Advocate Programs and Their Relationship to Quality Advocacy, 1
J. CTR. FOR CHILD. & CTS. 63, 64 (1999).
65 Id.
66 WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100 (2014).
67 Piraino, supra note 64, at 64-66. See also Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey,
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cle, our focus will be on those CASAs, like King County’s, who serve
directly as volunteer guardians ad litem.
As guardians ad litem, CASAs are not completely unprece-
dented. Guardians ad litem have long been appointed to direct the
legal representation of litigants who are deemed unable to do so
on their own. The guardian, “acting as a fiduciary, is empowered to
decide what is in the best interests of his ward and to determine
what position should be taken in the litigation; in carrying out his
duties, the guardian may ignore even his ward’s express wishes.”68
As other scholars have addressed, there are a myriad of issues with
the appointment of guardians ad litem generally, ranging from au-
tonomy concerns to potential procedural due process violations.69
Many of the issues raised in this article regarding the use of volun-
tary guardians ad litem in child welfare proceedings may apply to
the use of guardians ad litem in other contexts as well.
When it comes to child welfare proceedings, however, the role
of the guardian ad litem becomes especially muddled: while all
guardians ad litem are supposed to determine what result would be
in their ward’s best interests and direct the litigation accordingly,
in child welfare proceedings the question of the child’s best inter-
ests is not only an extremely complicated one—requiring countless
predicate conclusions about the value of a particular sort of family,
home, and community—but also frequently “the very issue being
litigated.”70 Essentially, “in order to play an active role in the litiga-
tion, the guardian first must determine who ought to prevail on
the merits,” as if the guardian were the judge.71 As will be discussed
below, these concerns are only exacerbated by the particular na-
ture of volunteer CASA programs, including their demographics,
the lack of standards governing the CASA’s role, and the wide lati-
tude CASAs are given on account of their role as charitable actors.
CASAs who function as voluntary guardians ad litem have a
complicated role; they are charged with investigating the child’s
Using Lay Volunteers to Represent Children in Child Protection Court Proceedings, 10 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 293, 294 (1986) (“The role of CASAs and other lay volunteer child
advocates varies greatly from community to community. The volunteer may operate
independently or may be paired with an attorney and become the ‘eyes and ears’ of
the child’s legal representative, doing separate investigations and independent advo-
cacy for the child.”). Cf. supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
68 Represented But Not Heard, supra note 57, at 94.
69 See, e.g., Donna S. Harkness, “Whenever Justice Requires”: Examining the Elusive Role
of Guardian Ad Litem for Adults with Diminished Capacity, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 1
(2006).
70 Represented But Not Heard, supra note 57, at 94.
71 Id.
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circumstances, making decisions about what is best for the child,
and directing the CASA’s legal representation on behalf of the
child. The CASA’s first task is investigatory—in theory, the CASA
meets with the child, her family, relevant community members,
teachers, doctors, and the child’s foster parents in order to gather
information about her situation.72 This fits with Soukup’s concern
that he simply did not know enough about the children who came
before him: if the CASA conducts a full investigation, she can ob-
tain information about the child’s life, community, schooling, and
needs that the overworked social workers and attorneys on the case
do not have time to gather.
Yet the CASA does not simply transmit that information to the
court. As a guardian ad litem, the CASA’s information-gathering is
directed at a specific end, namely, to determine what result or set
of results is in the best interests of the child to whom she is as-
signed.73 With the child’s parents stripped of their ability to speak
on their child’s behalf by the mere existence of the child protective
proceeding against them, the CASA’s role is to stand in their stead
and to determine not what the child wants, but what is, in the
CASA’s own estimation, best for the child. The CASA then relies
on this determination in two ways.
First, she will direct the child’s legal representation accord-
ingly, “just as” a parent would direct the attorney in any other kind
of case brought on behalf of their child.74 Should the CASA’s attor-
ney support the parent’s motion to dismiss the dependency peti-
tion or put on evidence to support a finding of neglect? Should the
CASA direct her attorney to support expanded visitation between
the child and her parents or oppose it? Are three months of suc-
cessful drug treatment enough, or should the attorney file a mo-
tion to require the parents to complete a year of drug treatment?
Again, in making these decisions, the CASA need not seek to
72 WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.105(1)(a) (2013) (listing the first duty of the guardian
ad litem as “[t]o investigate, collect relevant information about the child’s situation,
and report to the court factual information regarding the best interests of the child”).
Though advocates are encouraged to develop a relationship with the children they
work with, they are not mentors as much as investigators. Id.
73 CAPTA specifically requires that the “attorney or court-appointed special advo-
cate” appointed to represent the child both “obtain first-hand, a clear understanding
of the situation and needs of the child” and “make recommendations to the court
concerning the best interests of the child.” 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2016).
74 “Regardless of the program model, lay volunteers do not participate in the case
as legal counselors to the child,” but instead as “individuals appointed to represent
the child’s best interest, just as a parent would in a case not involving parental child
abuse or neglect.” Piraino, supra note 64, at 66.
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achieve the result preferred by the child herself, or the result
deemed desirable by any (or all) of the important people in the
child’s life with whom the CASA ideally will have consulted; it is the
CASA’s own view of the child’s best interests that controls.
Second, the CASA reports to the court not only about her im-
pressions of the child’s circumstances and the information gath-
ered through her investigation and her interactions with the child,
but also about her conclusions regarding the child’s best inter-
ests.75 Unlike the typical guardian described above—the guardian
who determines what is in her incapacitated ward’s best interests
solely so that she is able to direct the legal representation to that
end76—CASAs themselves regularly become witnesses in the child
protective proceedings, and one key piece of their testimony is
their ultimate conclusion regarding the result or set of results that
is in the best interests of the child. Thus, on the question of visita-
tion, for example, the CASA may offer testimony regarding her de-
termination that a move to overnight visitation is not in the child’s
best interests, while in a fact finding proceeding to determine
whether the child was in fact abused or neglected, she may testify
that entry of a finding of neglect against the child’s parents is in
the child’s interests. Again, what the child herself wants—to have
overnight visits, or to have the case dismissed so that she can go
home—is not controlling. It is the CASA’s own determination of
the child’s best interests that matters.
Who are CASAs, and how do they make these extremely im-
portant determinations about children to whom they have no prior
connection? First, CASAs are not only volunteers; they are, by de-
sign, lay volunteers. According to the national CASA training cur-
riculum, CASAs are recruited “not for their legal knowledge but
for their ‘unique qualities, community perspective, [and] common
sense approach[.]’”77 Thus, while all CASA volunteers undergo
training to prepare them for their roles—and while a professional
lawyer or social worker with the requisite free time and flexibility in
75 WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.105(1)(e) (2013) (“Court-appointed special advocates
and guardians ad litem may make recommendations based upon an independent in-
vestigation regarding the best interests of the child, which the court may consider and
weigh in conjunction with the recommendations of all of the parties”). Id.
§ 13.34.105(1)(f) (“[t]o represent and be an advocate for the best interests of the
child”).
76 Represented But Not Heard, supra note 57, at 94. See also, e.g., Noe v. True, 507 F.2d
9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974) (describing the role of a guardian ad litem appointed under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in directing the litigation on her ward’s behalf).
77 Piraino, supra note 64, at 67 (quoting NAT’L CASA ASS’N, COMPREHENSIVE TRAIN-
ING FOR THE CASA/GAL 42 (1989)).
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their schedule might be accepted as a CASA if they were to volun-
teer—CASAs are not expected to be any more expert in child wel-
fare practice, child development, psychology, or social work than
your average community member or parent would be.
Moreover, either by design or omission, there are few-to-no
standards to guide the CASA in applying their “community per-
spective” and “common sense” to the situations before them. While
federal law requires that an advocate be appointed, there are no
uniform rules describing the role of these advocates, their mini-
mum level of education or training, or their ethical or professional
duties in the case. As noted above, all CASAs must be trained—
federal law requires that the appointed advocate have “training ap-
propriate to the role”78—and the national CASA organization has
standards for local chapters and a recommended training curricu-
lum, but adoption of the curriculum by local chapters is strictly
voluntary,79 and adherence to the national standards is monitored
by means of a “self-assessment tool.”80 Ultimately, individual CASAs
can do as much or as little investigation as they want, and can rely
on anything from a therapist’s recommendation to their own “gut
reaction” or initial impression of the quality of the underlying par-
ent-child relationship to decide what is best for the child.81
78 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2016).
79 EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 1-3. Notably, while the R
standards developed by the national CASA organization require volunteers to com-
plete 30 hours of pre-service training each year and 12 hours of in-service training,
the actual length of time spent in training “depends on the specific training program,
but it may range from 3 hours (with continued training throughout the program) to
40 hours, with many programs falling somewhere in between.” Id. at 3. See also JEN-
NIFER LAWSON ET AL., COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES (CASA) AS AN INTERVEN-
TION FOR IMPROVING CHILD WELFARE CASE OUTCOMES: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 4-5
(2015), http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/295/ [https://
perma.cc/B8QP-P4WC] (describing variation in structure, training, standards, and
activities of CASA programs).
80 EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 1. R
81 In the world of child welfare, Congress has repeatedly endorsed particular prin-
ciples to curb arbitrary state interference with private family life. One of those, first
raised in 1977 in response to evidence that children were being needlessly separated
from their families, is the requirement that no child will be placed in foster care
“unless services aimed at preventing the need for placement have been provided or
refused by the family.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-394, at 8 (1977). See also H.R. REP. NO. 96-
136, pt. 1, at 23, 24 (1979) (“such services have been made available but refused by
the family”). Congress has repeatedly affirmed this requirement such that even today,
in most cases agencies are tasked with making “reasonable efforts” to make it possible
for the child to return to her family. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) (2015). Therefore,
social workers are tasked with making at least “reasonable efforts” to reunify the fam-
ily, subject to judicial oversight. Unlike the assigned social workers, the amount of
effort the CASA exerts is not a legal issue in the case because they are not bound by
any requirement to make reasonable efforts. A CASA can make a “reasonable effort”
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Finally—last but far from least—the demographics of CASA
volunteers could not be more distinct from the demographics of
families entangled in the child welfare system. While families of
color are overrepresented in the child welfare system, they are al-
most completely unrepresented in the ranks of CASA volunteers.
Eighty to ninety percent of CASAs are white.82 Surveys of local
CASA programs show that the typical volunteer is a white woman
between 40 and 59 years of age who has had college or post-gradu-
ate education.83
There is not a lot of good research on the effectiveness of
CASA programs, in part because it is hard to get reliable numbers
or to accurately compare data from individual CASA programs,
given the variation in standards, training, role definition, and re-
quirements for appointment of a CASA.84 It is also hard to know
what the results of the few existing studies mean. For example,
does the fact that children who are assigned CASAs receive more
services than those who are not85 mean that CASAs are particularly
effective at identifying and accessing the services the children
need, that CASAs are disproportionately assigned to more compli-
cated cases where the children involved require more services, or
that CASAs are quicker to refer children to services even when
those services may not be necessary?
While studies have indicated that CASA programs may have
some positive results—including increased access to services,86 as
described above, and fewer placements within care87—there are
or a minimal effort or no effort to reunify a family, but that will not be an issue subject
to judicial oversight. And unlike social workers, CASAs are under no legal obligation
to use their efforts to keep the family together at any point. In fact, a CASA can
actively thwart reunification and still be operating within their role.
82  LAWSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 2 (“Research on CASA volunteer
demographics consistently shows that they are overwhelmingly (80-90%) White, in
contrast to the foster care population, in which children of color are distinctly
overrepresented.”).
83 See EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 2-3. R
84 See LAWSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 8-11 (discussing recurring problems with
empirical studies of CASA programs).
85 See, e.g., EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 7 (“Although R
the literature suggests that children with CASA volunteers receive more services than
children without CASA volunteers, there is little known about the types of services
that CASA volunteers are acquiring for children or the level of need for these
services.”).
86 See, e.g., EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 5, 7, 37-39; Pat R
Litzelfelner, The Effectiveness of CASAs in Achieving Positive Outcomes for Children, 79
CHILD WELFARE 179, 190 (2000).
87 “In addition to the type of placement for the child, the number of placements
the child experiences is also important. It can be very disruptive for a child to be
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 25 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 25 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY102.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-FEB-17 11:25
44 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:23
other troubling findings. In one recent study commissioned by the
national CASA organization itself, CASA volunteers were found to
spend less time on cases involving Black children than those involv-
ing white children.88 The same study also found that volunteers
spent an average of only 3.22 hours on each of their cases per
month.89
Most significantly, CASA volunteers were found to reduce the
likelihood of a successful reunification between children and their
parents.90 In other words, CASA volunteers confound the stated
purpose of the dependency system: to mend families.91 Indeed,
moved from one place to another, so minimizing the number of placements is impor-
tant. A study by Litzelfelner (2000) found that children with CASA volunteers had
fewer placements (3.9 on average) than those without CASA volunteers (6.6 on aver-
age). Calkins and Millar (1999) found similar results: children with CASA volunteers
had significantly fewer placements (3.3 on average) than children without CASA vol-
unteers (4.6 on average). A study by Leung (1996), however, does not support these
findings. Leung found no significant differences in the number of placements exper-
ienced by children with and without CASA volunteers.” EVALUATION OF CASA REPRE-
SENTATION, supra note 2, at 5-6. On the other hand, another recent study found that R
there were significantly more out-of-home placements when CASAs were involved.
Laurie J. Tuff, Court Appointed Special Advocates: Is Their Impact Effectively Evalu-
ated by Current Research Methodology? 21, 23 (July 2, 2014) (unpublished M.A. the-
sis, University of Washington), https://www.uwb.edu/getattachment/policystudies/
why-policy-studies/student-work/tuff-capstone.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF77-UPU8].
88 EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 22; see also Barbara R
White Stack, An Evaluation of Volunteers Courts Controversy, YOUTH TODAY (July 1, 2004),
http://youthtoday.org/2004/07/an-evaluation-of-volunteers-courts-controversy
[https://perma.cc/VC9E-GS4T].
89 EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 15.
90 Id. at 43, 48; Davin Youngclarke et al., A Systematic Review of the Impact of Court
Appointed Special Advocates, 5 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 109, 119 (2009)
(finding CASA assigned cases were more likely to end in adoption, equally likely to
result in reunification, and equally likely to result in long-term foster care place-
ments); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 07-04,
NATIONAL COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE PROGRAM 19 (2006), https://
oig.justice.gov/reports/OJP/a0704/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAN5-2K7F] (find-
ing that children in CASA assigned cases were “more likely to be adopted and less
likely to be reunified with their parents”); KATHY BRENNAN ET AL., UNIV. OF WASH. SCH.
OF SOC. WORK & WASH. STATE CTR. FOR COURT RESEARCH, WASHINGTON STATE COURT
APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT 30, 53 (2010), https://
www.courts.wa.gov/wsccr/docs/CASA%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3AT4-LLXZ] (finding of reunification was forty-eight percent for children
assigned to CASA staff, forty-six percent for those assigned contract GALs, forty-four
percent for those assigned neither a CASA nor a GAL, and forty-one percent for those
assigned a CASA, but only twenty-nine percent of CASA assigned cases resulted in
reunification, compared with thirty-six percent for contract GALs and thirty-eight per-
cent for CASA staff).
91 The purpose of the dependency system is to mend families. “The primary pur-
pose of a dependency is to allow courts to order remedial measures to preserve and
mend family ties.” In re Dependency of Schermer, 169 P.3d 452, 460 (Wash. 2007)
(quoting In re Dependency of T.L.G., 108 P.3d 156, 168 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)).
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preventing reunification between a parent and child, and advocat-
ing for the termination of parental rights, is entirely consistent with
a CASA’s role even as it cuts against the larger stated goal of the
system. In that way, a CASA differs significantly from the social
worker assigned to the family by the state. The social worker has a
duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family before pursu-
ing termination.92 But a CASA is free to advocate and press for
termination of parental rights, even if the state and the child disa-
gree, if, in her lay opinion, termination is in the child’s best inter-
ests. Therefore, it is significant but not entirely surprising that
having a CASA assigned decreases the chance of reunification.
Lastly, though counterintuitive, CASA programs actually cost a
significant amount of money. A 2014 study of the CASA program
found that CASA programs reported a total revenue of 304 million
dollars in 2014, more than half of which came from public
sources.93 Though based on the work of volunteers, CASA pro-
grams require managers to assign cases, supervisors to advise the
CASAs, lawyers to represent them in court, administrative assist-
ants, not to mention a physical space and other operating costs.
In sum, CASAs have been granted a wide ranging role to influ-
ence the outcome of child welfare cases even though they are gov-
erned by few standards and have not been demonstrated to be
particularly effective; they are granted enormous deference though
they rely on tax payer dollars, expend less effort on Black children,
and reduce the likelihood that families can remain together. One
might wonder how a system of CASAs came to exist in a legal sys-
tem that, theoretically, aims to protect a parent’s fundamental con-
stitutional right to family integrity. The next section will begin to
situate CASA programs within a larger historical story.
II. CASA PROGRAMS AND THE PRIVILEGING OF WHITE
MOTHERHOOD
Choose your favorite adage: what’s past is prologue, or Faulk-
ner, “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” The history of
child welfare is no different; it sets up themes that repeat over and
over. As described above, CASA volunteers are predominantly
white, middle-class women. Child welfare-involved families are dis-
proportionately families of color, and are overwhelmingly low-in-
92 See supra note 81.
93 NAT’L CASA ASS’N, ANNUAL LOCAL PROGRAM SURVEY REPORT 11 (2014), http://
nc.casaforchildren.org/files/public/community/programs/Statistics/2014_Local_
Survey_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WC4-L66S].
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come. This is nothing new. The decision to include a CASA’s voice
in child welfare proceedings represents a decision to endorse a
particular set of values that have been part of the debate for as long
as child welfare policy has existed.94 The race and gender make-up
of volunteer CASA programs is one manifestation of the long his-
torical trend linking volunteerism, child welfare, and white
privilege.
The creation of the child welfare system in America is inextri-
cably linked to the themes discussed in this paper.95 It was during
the period after the Civil War that white women embraced a role as
benevolent reformers, capitalizing on their presumed moral au-
94 This paper starts looking at child welfare policy beginning in the 1880s, al-
though that is a somewhat arbitrary choice. Typical history of child welfare policy
begins by describing the “bad old days” when a “man’s home is his castle,” and moves
on to address the “discovery” of child maltreatment in 1874, with the “Mary Ellen”
case. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOS-
TER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 33-34 (1999). It then jumps to the “redis-
covery” of child maltreatment in 1962, with C. Henry Kempe’s work on “battered
child syndrome.” See, e.g., id. at 34; John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in
America, 42 FAM. L.Q. 449 (2009). The “typical” history casts an uncritical look at the
charitable institutions that emerged in a limited way during the antebellum period
and became a major force for social change after the Civil War. This paper highlights
some of the more critical scholarship which identifies problems with the work. If
space were not an issue and the goal were simply to give a more thorough accounting
of the development of modern child welfare, this paper could have easily started at
the point of slavery, and the systematic use of family destruction as a form of social
control. For all the good that has come out of the child-saving movement, it is no less
a part of that history than of the alternative history presented by scholars like
Bartholet. “Black mothers’ bonds with their children have been marked by brutal
disruption, beginning with the slave auction where family members were sold to dif-
ferent masters and continuing in the disproportionate state removal of Black children
to foster care.” Dorothy E. Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 141, 146 (1995). In fact, it might even be said that “until 1865 slavery was the
major child welfare institution for Black children in this country, since that social
institution had under its mantle the largest numbers of Black children.” BILLINGSLEY
& GIOVANNONI, supra note 14, at 23.
95 Linda Gordon made this point explicitly when she wrote, “[i]n most respects,
though certainly not all, the perspective and structures that child-protection work de-
veloped by 1920 remain today.” LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE
POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 61 (1988). There are many interesting
themes worthy of an entire paper that are beyond the scope of our inquiry here,
including the ongoing push-pull between upper-class charitable volunteers and mid-
dle-class professional social workers. The professionalization of social work and the
attempts to develop more scientific methods for the so-called helping professions
have historically led to conflicts among women regarding who was best positioned to
do good. See generally REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED
MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890-1945 (1993). Al-
though these debates remain relevant today, particularly in those courtrooms where a
professional social worker and a volunteer CASA sit before the same judicial officer
and can give competing views of the case, this dynamic is largely beyond the scope of
this paper.
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thority over family matters and extending that authority to “rescue”
work on behalf of poor women and children. From the beginning,
these movements used systems of child welfare to reproduce and
maintain racial hierarchies. Notions of pure, good, white mother-
hood were used to set the bar for what was deemed safe and appro-
priate parenting, and formed the basis for an expansion of the
intrusion into the private family life of those whose parenthood did
not conform to that ideal. And, although the work was ostensibly
benevolent, white women used the power they claimed over poor
families as a foothold to lift their own standing in society, while
actors within the legal system simultaneously relied on white wo-
men’s judgment to rationalize state control over poor families.
The following sections briefly review the historical roots of the
child welfare system in an attempt to provide context for modern-
day volunteer CASA programs. Today’s child welfare system, just
like its antecedent a hundred years ago, relies disproportionately
on the views of white women to define appropriate parenting to
the detriment of those who are the objects of the system’s
intervention.
A. Women’s Work, Power, and the Charitable Class
Middle-class white women have long asserted their own influ-
ence by claiming specialized authority over matters of the family: as
far back as the Revolutionary War, white middle-class urban elites
claimed their “moral motherhood” as the virtuous moral agents
who would bring up the next generation of George Washingtons.96
Historically, these claims have been tied to highly gendered no-
tions of women’s “natural” affinity for caring and for children. Yet
the authority claimed eventually went far beyond the private
sphere of the home, as women sought to use their “moral mother-
hood” as a basis for real social and political power. In the face of
ideologies that deemed women’s role to be in the home, white wo-
men often justified their political reform activity by asserting the
need for their traditional feminine values and skills as mothers to
be extended beyond the home into society to uplift women and
children of other races and classes whom they characterized as
oppressed.97
96 SHARON HAYS, CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 29 (1996). See also
Brenda G. McGowan, Historical Evolution of Child Welfare Services, in CHILD WELFARE FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 11
(Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2d ed. 2014).
97 Margaret D. Jacobs, The Great White Mother: Maternalism and American Indian
Child Removal in the American West, 1880-1940, in ONE STEP OVER THE LINE: TOWARD A
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 27 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 27 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY102.txt unknown Seq: 26  1-FEB-17 11:25
48 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:23
Some women’s benevolent projects to aid widows and orphans
began to emerge as early as the turn of the nineteenth century,98
culminating in mid-century efforts by the Children’s Aid Society to
remove more than forty thousand children from New York City
“slums” and send them to farm families in the West.99 Indeed, it
was during this time that the phrase “best interests of the child”
emerged as a legal standard, as a way to sanction the “broad discre-
tionary authority” of private and public actors to determine the in-
terests of children when parents were deemed to have failed.100 But
it was not until the 1870s that a “new burst of Protestant evangeli-
calism, . . . strongly flavored by American nationalism,” led to the
expansion of this work beyond a few major urban centers.101
As the country came out of the Civil War, massive social
changes were underway that would fundamentally alter the rela-
tionship between the state, charitable organizations, and the fam-
ily. In particular, the large-scale economic growth of the country
after the Civil War helped to free funds for the development of
private philanthropies.102 Women’s groups founded during the war
were looking for outlets for the skills they had honed organizing
the relief effort,103 and new benevolent groups formed around a
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE NORTH AMERICAN WESTS 191, 195 (Elizabeth Jameson &
Sheila McManus eds., 2008). There is a different story, grounded in feminist theory
that is beyond the scope of this paper, which would tease out which “feminisms” have
historically established solidarity with other groups and which “feminisms” have been
used as a tool of white supremacy. See generally, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE &
CLASS (1981); cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (discussing the way in which certain contemporary feminist
legal theorists fall into the trap of a “gender essentialism” that silences the voices of
Black women, among others). The role of feminist movements in shaping child wel-
fare is a topic deserving of further attention—according to at least one scholar, from
the mid-nineteenth century on, “it was the women’s-rights movement that . . . opened
the family to scrutiny.” GORDON, supra note 95, at 80.
98 PEGGY PASCOE, RELATIONS OF RESCUE: THE SEARCH FOR FEMALE MORAL AUTHOR-
ITY IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1874-1939 4-5 (1990).
99 McGowan, supra note 96, at 14 (describing the plan of Loring Brace and the
Children’s Aid Society in New York to save poor children from the evils of urban life);
Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820-1935,
in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3, 19 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002)
(describing the purpose of Brace’s work as to “disassemble slum families”).
100 Grossberg, supra note 99, at 8.
101 PASCOE, supra note 98, at 5 (“This city-by-city extension of benevolent work cre-
ated a firm foundation for the national expansion that took place after the Civil
War.”).
102 McGowan, supra note 96, at 12.
103 GORDON, supra note 95, at 33; DAVIS, supra note 97, at 34, 39; see generally David
S. Tanenhaus, Between Dependency and Liberty: The Conundrum of Children’s Rights in the
Gilded Age, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 351, 364 (2005) (discussing the social and political
climate following the Civil War and the extent to which advocates for children pressed
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variety of issues including providing “rescue homes” for unmarried
mothers, prostitutes, and women “fleeing” polygamy.104 It was at
this time that child-saving gathered steam as a major subject of
public concern. The “wave of humanitarian reform” following the
end of the war changed the nature of civil society as it “expanded
the boundaries of individual and collective moral responsibility,”105
and this enlarged sense of responsibility propelled charitable
groups to “save the nation’s young.”106
What resulted was a massive effort by philanthropic organiza-
tions to identify child maltreatment and rescue children—specifi-
cally, poor and working-class immigrant children—from their
families.107 Some of the first child welfare agencies were called So-
cieties for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC).108 Al-
though the SPCCs were originally created in response to publicized
cases of physical brutality against children,109 the societies eventu-
ally “adopted expansive definitions of cruelty that sanctioned ex-
tensive policing of working-class families aimed at imposing
middle-class family norms on those households.”110 And while
the notion that the new era warranted reconsideration of the rights of children, argu-
ing that children “like the freed people, possessed civil rights”).
104 PASCOE, supra note 98, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted) (“Protestant women formed so
many organizations in these years that one twentieth-century commentator labeled
the 1870s ‘the church women’s decade.’”).
105 Michael Grossberg, “A Protected Childhood”: The Emergence of Child Protection in
America, in AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 213, 214 (Wendy
Gamber et al. eds., 2003). The “persistent American embrace of antistatism” was chal-
lenged during this period by a reevaluation of the need for “governmental action . . .
to police families more vigorously.” Id. at 218. See also McGowan, supra note 96, at 16
(describing the subsequent efforts of middle-class reform groups in Chicago, led by
Julia Lathrop and Jane Addams, to advocate for law reform that would enable them to
remove children “from corrupting influences”).
106 Grossberg, supra note 105, at 218.
107 Grossberg, supra note 99, at 10.
108 The historical record of early meetings of these societies indicate that the foun-
ders “saw their primary function as prosecuting parents,” and though they were
spurred to act by concerns about child abuse, they “quickly turned their interests to
all forms of child neglect and exploitation.” McGowan, supra note 96, at 17. See also
GORDON, supra note 95, at 2-3, 27-58; Grossberg, supra note 105, at 219-24; BARBARA
NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE 7-9 (1984) (describing the development of
the SPCCs). Initially these organizations were staffed by men, with quasi-police pow-
ers, though they worked for private agencies. But by the 1920s the work of these
groups was dominated by women. See GORDON, supra note 95, at 14.
109 Child saving claimed widespread attention when a young girl in New York City
named Mary Ellen was found starving and severely abused; she described severe beat-
ings and being locked in a closet by her stepmother. As Grossberg writes, “the story
burst like a thunderstorm on the city and the nation, forcing the knowledge of a
particular social evil onto a shocked society.” Grossberg, supra note 105, at 219. But see
supra note 94, addressing the limitations of this story.
110 Grossberg, supra note 99, at 27.
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child abuse did occur, many cases of “cruelty” arose from the con-
ditions of poverty itself: “disease and malnutrition, children left un-
attended while their parents worked, children not warmly dressed,
houses without heat, bedding crawling with vermin, unchanged
diapers, injuries left without medical treatment[.]”111 Parents came
to fear these privately organized but state-sanctioned societies that
had the power to take their children. Boston’s SPCC, for example,
became known to the poor who experienced it as “the Cruelty,” a
nickname that “did not seem regrettable to its agents.”112
It was at this same time, beginning about 1880, that the United
States government began to promote boarding schools for Native
American children as a primary means to “assimilate” them. “By
1900, the government had established . . . boarding schools . . . for
about 21,500 Native American children. Officials sought to remove
every [Native] child to a boarding school for a period of at least
three years.”113 As with the child-saving efforts of the SPCCs, white
middle-class women were “integrally involved in the removal of
American Indian children to boarding schools”114: “[w]hite women
comprised the majority of boarding school employees and acted as
the primary day-to-day contacts with indigenous children who had
111 Id. (quoting Linda Gordon, Family Violence as History and Politics, RADICAL
AMERICA, July-Aug. 1987, at 21, 26). These allegations will likely read as familiar to
anyone currently practicing child welfare law. See also Tanenhaus, supra note 103, at
370-71 (describing the plan of states in the Midwest to remove children from “alms-
houses” and “poorhouses” where children were surrounded by adults, presumably in-
cluding their parents, who were “degrading and vicious influences,” in particular the
“Michigan Plan” which was the creation of a state central school in Coldwater where
children “lived in congregate housing and were groomed for placement in private
homes”); McGowan, supra note 96, at 13-15, 18-19 (discussing the rise in orphanages
as a response to the conditions of almshouses, and noting that prior to the Civil War,
black dependent children who were not sold as slaves were cared for in almshouses,
but as orphanages came to predominate, black children were explicitly excluded from
private orphanages, leading to the creation of a few separate facilities for black chil-
dren, which were ultimately destroyed by white mobs and riots). Interestingly, in find-
ing that children deserved better quality of life than was available to their parents in
an almshouse, it is easy to see how poverty alone has historically formed a basis for
removing children from their parents. Eventually, “neglect . . . replaced poverty as the
legal basis for depriving parents of . . . their children, but for the most part, poverty
was simply equated with neglect.” Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical
Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 13 (2001)
(quoting Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 435
(1983)).
112 GORDON, supra note 95, at 52.
113 Jacobs, supra note 97, at 192-93 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also
MARGARET D. JACOBS, WHITE MOTHER TO A DARK RACE: SETTLER COLONIALISM,
MATERNALISM, AND THE REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE AMERICAN WEST AND
AUSTRALIA, 1880-1940 87-148 (2009).
114 Jacobs, supra note 97, at 192.
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been removed and institutionalized.”115 While the women’s efforts
were experienced as acts of extreme violence by many of those af-
fected by them—many of whom resisted the women’s attempts to
remove their children by hiding them in the bushes, pretending
that they were ill, and even drugging them so that they were too
sick to be taken off to school116—these “reformers,” like their
“child-saving” counterparts in the east, “employed a rhetoric of hu-
manitarianism in justifying their policies of Indian child
removal.”117
B. The Rescue Fantasy
Gordon and Pascoe describe the “rescue fantasy” of the benev-
olent women’s groups as grounded in their view of themselves as
superior to the objects of their charity.118 The sincerity of these
early reformers’ desire to help poor families was matched only by
their condescension towards them; the concern was sincere, but
was also “a concern already shaped by confidence in their own ad-
vantages[.]”119 “If the early child protectors were insensitive to the
power relations in their work, if they saw their clients as helpless
and grateful, that very ignorance left them a clear emotional path
on which to follow their kind and helping impulses.”120 The fact
that these women genuinely thought that they were helping the
recipients of their interventions kept them from questioning the
propriety of even the most extreme of activities.
Writing about the efforts of white women to remove Native
American children to boarding schools, historian Margaret Jacobs
notes that “many white women reformers claimed for themselves
the role of a ‘Great White Mother’ who would save her benighted
115 Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
116 Id. at 204.
117 Id. at 199.
118 “Because they believed that women were the proper moral guardians of society,
home mission women assumed it was their duty to extend middle-class moral stan-
dards everywhere.” PASCOE, supra note 98, at 9. “Like the female moral reform socie-
ties that had been their clearest predecessors, they preached Victorian female values
of piety and purity in an attempt to set moral standards for their communities, their
regions, and their nation.” Id. at 6. Although women’s groups originally articulated
their positions as against male-dominated social orders, that changed over time. As
Pascoe explains, “as the institutions developed, middle-class women expressed their
quest for authority less often in relation to men and more in relations with rescue of
home residents.” Id. at 31. See also Jacobs, supra note 97, at 208 (“A steadfast belief in
the superiority of white womanhood and a desire to reform and control Indian wo-
men permeated white women’s pronouncements about rescue work.”).
119 PASCOE, supra note 98, at 51.
120 GORDON, supra note 95, at 48.
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Indian ‘daughters.’”121 For example, “Victorian observers making
comments about Indian women were inclined to shake their heads
in disapproval and count their blessings as members of a superior
society.”122 These women “were aware that Navaho women were
property owners and family heads, but they were unable to see
these positions as indicators of authority.”123 Similarly, “in identify-
ing the problems in need of correction, early child protectors saw
the mistreatment of children through their own cultural lenses”
and “their sense of mission was more powerful because it came
from a feeling of unquestioned superiority to the masses among
whom neglect and abuse were so widespread.”124
This feeling of superiority was used to justify state policies of
indigenous child removal.125 Equating “indigeneity with backward-
ness, poverty, immorality, and parental neglect[,]”126 white female
reformers and government officials saw removal as the only way to
“civilize” Native communities and protect their children.127 For ex-
ample, reformers expressly condemned the use of cradle boards by
Native American women, “queer little canopied baskets” used to
carry swaddled babies.128 One missionary wrote derisively, “I found
a woman with a sick baby not yet three weeks old; of course it was
strapped upon a board; and it was moaning with fever.”129 Reform-
ers also implied that Native homes simply could not be suitable for
the upbringing of children. “What a contrast!” a reformer ex-
claimed, describing her visit to a reservation:
The smoking fire in the centre of the tepee, and on it the pot of
soup stirred by the not over-clean squaw . . . . a few blankets the
only furnishing . . . . and then to think of the neat, comfortable
home at the mission, with the uplifting of its daily prayer . . . .
121 Jacobs, supra note 97, at 192 (footnote omitted). “Some white women played an
active role in Indian child removal—not just as caregivers of removed Indian children
but as their actual recruiters, the euphemistic term reformers used.” Id. at 197.
122 PASCOE, supra note 98, at 56.
123 Id. at 57 (“Wrapped up in their own notions, home mission women did not
recognize sources of women’s power apart from the Victorian ideals of female moral
purity and the Christian home.”).
124 GORDON, supra note 95, at 46.
125 As Jacobs explains, both reformers and officials “routinely characterized the re-
moval of American Indian children as an act of benevolence aimed at ‘rescuing the
children and youth from barbarism or savagery.’ This rhetoric rested on a racialized
discourse that deemed indigenous peoples to be lower on the scale of humanity than
white Anglo-Saxon, middle-class Protestants.” Jacobs, supra note 97, at 199 (footnote
omitted).
126 Id. at 200.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 201.
129 Id. (footnote omitted).
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We realized what a blessed work these faithful missionaries . . .
were doing in giving to these poor, neglected children . . . some
of the light and blessing that had been given to them.130
Here, it is easy to see the underside of charity work: it is not
only propelled by feelings of superiority among the charitable
class, but it represents the exercise of real power. Gordon notes
that, “[t]he rescue fantasy reflected not only [the benevolent wo-
men’s] class condescension but also their search for an area in
which to feel powerful[.]”131 As “well-intentioned” as they may have
been, women benefitted from their charitable work, which allowed
them to occupy public positions of leadership and power,132 the
exercise of which led to the destruction of other women’s families.
In the case of Indian Boarding Schools, Jacobs observes that the
government’s need for personnel to carry out assimilation policy
“dovetailed with white women’s own ambitions.”133 That was how it
came to be that white women became the majority of boarding
school employees.134
The “rescue fantasy,” therefore, is the expression of two sepa-
rate ideas: that non-white children and children from poor and
working class families were in need of rescue and that economi-
cally privileged white women were naturally well suited to the task
of saving those children. The effect was self-reinforcing: white wo-
men used their moral purity as a basis for large-scale intervention
in other families, and, in both demonizing and “helping” those
130 Id. at 201-02.
131 GORDON, supra note 95, at 32-33 (“Child saving drew heavily on women’s reform
and philanthropic energy, and was influenced by feminist interpretations of social
ills. . . . . These early child-saving efforts were characterized by what psychiatrist John
Bowlby has called the ‘rescue fantasy.’ The reformers saw themselves as gracious, priv-
ileged big sisters, not only of children but of adult women of the lower classes. . . . The
rescue fantasy reflected not only their class condescension but also their search for an
arena in which to feel powerful, and, as has often been the case with women, their
religious conviction justified their stepping out of their domestic sphere.”)
132 Women took a prominent role in these reforms. Grossberg, supra note 99, at 24
(“The gendered reality of American civil society thus provided a way for women to
increase their sphere of influence.”). And, the philanthropic organizations that these
women created became “ever more powerful actors in the discussion and implemen-
tation of vital public policies.” Id.; PASCOE, supra note 98, at 4 (“Benevolent activity
provided women with an opportunity for moral stewardship roughly parallel to the
commercial leadership exercised by local merchants.”). Although charity work be-
came increasingly professionalized over the years, opportunities for volunteers contin-
ued. The “professionalization” of social work had class connotations, bringing in
more middle-class rather than upper-middle-class women. See GORDON, supra note 95,
at 65-67.
133 Jacobs, supra note 97, at 197.
134 Id.
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 30 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 30 Side B      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY102.txt unknown Seq: 32  1-FEB-17 11:25
54 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:23
families, further ensured their own superior status.135 Of course,
“they carried off this balancing act partly by directing their sharp-
est critiques at families outside [their own] Victorian middle-class
culture”136: working class and poor families, immigrant families,
and Native American families.
C. Racial Hierarchies
As is evident, the parenting standards by which families were
judged were not value-free, but rather part of a race-and-class con-
tingent set of knowledge. “What child-neglect cases have in com-
mon is that they must by definition project an inverse standard, a
norm of proper child-raising.”137 Historically, the dominant narra-
tive of good mothering was (and continues to be) predicated on
the parenting ideals of white, native-born, middle-class women—
“the most powerful, visible, and self-consciously articulated” set of
parenting norms.138 These principles are so firmly ingrained that it
is hard to notice that they are not obviously correct.139 As Elisabeth
Badinter writes in a different context, “[w]hether or not they are
aware of it, all women are influenced by [the prevailing] ideal [of
good motherhood]. They might accept or avoid it, negotiate with
or reject it, but ultimately their choices are made in relation to
it.”140
Thus, the SPCCs’ “images of good and bad child-raising were
deeply influenced by the sensibility of [the] upper-class women”
who headed those societies: concerned with “cleanliness, fine
dress, good food, order, and quiet,” they sought to save children
who were “improperly dressed or excessively dirty,” children who
worked alongside their parents by begging or peddling in the
streets, children who were not in school, and children who became
135 PASCOE, supra note 98, at 51 (“Thus, while Protestant women entered into ‘wo-
man’s work for woman’ with sincere concern for the women they hoped to welcome
to their rescue homes, it was a concern already shaped by confidence in their own
advantages, and that concern was combined with a determination to retain a line
between moral and immoral women, to ensure their own status.”).
136 Id. at 34.
137 GORDON, supra note 95, at 7.
138 HAYS, supra note 96, at 21.
139 The impact of notions of “ideal” parenting on child welfare go beyond the
CASA program. “[T]he ideology of the ideal family is a pillar of American legal con-
sciousness that has sidelined nonconforming policy proposals and has had an untold
and profound impact on the lives of foster children.” Adler, supra note 111, at 4 (foot-
notes omitted).
140 ELISABETH BADINTER, THE CONFLICT: HOW MODERN MOTHERHOOD UNDERMINES
THE STATUS OF WOMEN 115 (2011).
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injured while playing outside.141 Similarly, during the Progressive
Era, the identification of children who lacked a middle-class child-
hood was considered a problem—“[i]t encouraged the conclusion
that a proper childhood must be imposed if it was not voluntarily
embraced.”142 Child protection was invoked to ban children from
entering dance halls or skating rinks or joining the circus.143 The
child savers simply could not see or value family difference or ac-
count for the variations in families’ circumstances, blinded as they
were by the dominant ideas of good motherhood. When mother-
ing “was not done well, according to the standards of the child pro-
tectors, that inadequacy was not a sign of obstacles, resistance, or
inadequate resources, but of character flaw.”144
Yet the racial aspect of the child-saving movement was—and
is—more than just a subtext or a “mere” side effect of the correla-
tion between race and class in American society. White woman-
hood has been long associated with purity, refinement, and
correctness—characterizations that hold racial meaning.145 White
women’s self-conception “came to be intimately tied to idealized
images of ‘true womanhood’ through which the virtues of piety,
purity, submissiveness, and domesticity were extolled”—images
that evolved in contrast to depictions of Black and Native women as
“degraded, immoral, and sexually promiscuous others.”146 And
these contrasting visions of womanhood did more than just en-
hance white women’s power as morally virtuous agents of proper
domesticity. Rather, the “concept of white womanhood was essen-
tial to . . . galvanize support for white supremacy[,]”147 a symbol
used to justify countless racist acts, including the widespread lynch-
ing of Black men.148 Similarly, “as white women articulated a sense
141 GORDON, supra note 95, at 36-38; Grossberg, supra note 99, at 27 (“The societies
adopted expansive definitions of cruelty that sanctioned extensive policing of work-
ing-class families aimed at imposing middle-class family norms on those
households.”).
142 Grossberg, supra note 99, at 23.
143 Grossberg, supra note 105, at 222.
144 GORDON, supra note 95, at 99.
145 “White evangelical reformers invoked racial representations of themselves as
sexually pure and refined and their predominately white charges as redeemable, even
as their declarations of a cross-class sisterhood obscured the racial homogeneity of
that proposed sorority.” KUNZEL, supra note 95, at 13.
146 Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojouner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Prop-
erty, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 339 (1996). See generally Bela August Walker, Fractured
Bonds: Policing Whiteness and Womanhood Through Race-Based Marriage Annulments, 58
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2008); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determina-
tion in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998).
147 Walker, supra note 146, at 33.
148 Victorians were “eager to defend the purity of white womanhood, the cultural
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of difference between themselves and native women as mothers,
they helped to construct racial ideologies that deemed Indian peo-
ples to be in need of ‘civilization’ by their white benefactors.”149
Because the work of the charitable class was explicitly founded
on notions of white women’s moral, racial, and sexual purity, it is
not surprising that the work itself was necessarily interwoven with
efforts to maintain and reproduce race and class hierarchies; while
the work was justified as an attempt to help individual families cor-
rect problems within their households, only certain types of fami-
lies had those “problems.” Writing about Societies for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children in Massachusetts, Gordon ob-
serves that the clients “of children’s protective agencies were
mainly poor immigrants of non-elite ethnic and racial back-
grounds.”150 Notes from the Societies describe Italian women as,
“contriving still, in the crowded rooms, to roll their dirty macaroni,
and all talking excitedly; a bedlam of sounds, and a combination of
odors from garlic, monkeys, and most dirty human persons.”151
MSPCC records “called clients shiftless, coarse, low type, uncouth,
immoral, feebleminded, lazy, and worthless (or occasionally, posi-
tively, good or sober)[.]”152 Black women were seen as “‘primitive,’
‘limited,’ ‘not nearly as talkative as many of her race, but appar-
ently truthful,’ ‘fairly good for a colored woman.’”153
Just as often, of course, white supremacy justified ignoring the
needs of Black families altogether.154 Black children were systemat-
ically excluded from child welfare services in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.155 During this time, “[e]vangelical
women and social workers argued that the supposed lack of stigma
surrounding illegitimacy in [B]lack communities justified the seg-
regation of their homes [for unwed mothers].”156 This is unsurpris-
symbol used to justify, among other things, the widespread lynching of blacks in the
American South.” PASCOE, supra note 98, at 134. See also DAVIS, supra note 97, at 172-
201 (discussing the myth of the Black rapist); KUNZEL, supra note 95, at 12-13 (discuss-
ing the intersection of gender ideology and anti-Black racism in the concept of “true
womanhood”).
149 Jacobs, supra note 97, at 192.
150 GORDON, supra note 95, at 8. See also Jacobs, supra note 97, at 199.
151 GORDON, supra note 95, at 40.
152 Id. at 15.
153 Id. at 14.
154 See ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 7; BILLINGSLEY & GIOVANNONI, supra note 14, at 45-
86.
155 McGowan, supra note 96, at 25.
156 KUNZEL, supra note 95, at 71. So early evangelical maternity homes, “strived to
be racially homogeneous. The NFCM [National Florence Crittendon Mission] noted
that ‘the handling of girls of mixed races in the same institution is difficult’ and de-
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ing seeing as, in the Post-Reconstruction Era, the child welfare
system was not needed to enforce white supremacy on Black com-
munities—Jim Crow, “the legal system of segregation and the reign
of lynch law were already well established.”157 It was only in the
mid-twentieth century, with the collapse of de jure segregation and
the opening of the welfare rolls to Black families, that the need to
“protect” Black children was discovered.158
D. Intertwining of the Charitable Class and the Court
Ultimately, the power of the charitable class was dependent on
the recognition they were afforded by government, and in particu-
lar, by legal systems. The power of a Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children, “of course, depended upon the Society’s influ-
ence in court.”159 But, fortunately for those charitable workers,
“judges usually accepted the agency’s advice.”160 As Gordon ex-
plains, “[w]hile the MSPCC did lose criminal assault cases at times,
in the legally noncriminal cases of neglect, it was virtually a judge’s
private advisor.”161 Similarly, “[m]aternity home workers valued an
alliance with the court for several reasons, not least of which was
the legitimacy that such an alliance conferred upon their
homes.”162 In New York, the Florence Crittenton Mission employed
an “all-night missionary, who sat in on the night court sessions reg-
ularly to ‘see what service she can render to any of the cases.’ ‘Fre-
quently,’ the mission reported, ‘she is called upon by the Judge to
advise as to the proper disposition to make of the case,’” and
judges would sometimes sentence women to the Mission itself.163
The trend was for benevolent women’s groups to become ever
more closely intertwined with the police and the government in
general—but their “first important liaison was with the court
clared it ‘wise to restrict admission to girls of one color.’ This color, with very few
exceptions, was white.” Id. at 29-30.
157 DAVIS, supra note 97, at 112, 116.
158 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 10, at 133-34. This article does not address the transi-
tion to contemporary child welfare policy, but if it did the same patterns would be-
come clear: by 1999, less than forty years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
six out of ten children in foster care were Black, a situation that led white child advo-
cates like law professor Elizabeth Bartholet to call for an increase in the transracial
adoption of Black children by “nurturing” white middle-class families. See, e.g.,
BARTHOLET, supra note 94, at 176-83.
159 GORDON, supra note 95, at 51.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 KUNZEL, supra note 95, at 15.
163 Id.
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system.”164
III. THE QUESTIONABLE ADVOCACY OF THE CASA
As described above, the child welfare system was founded on
notions of superiority among a charitable class of white women,
who used their presumed authority over the domestic sphere as a
basis to intervene and “protect” poor children of color. That pre-
sumed authority—the unearned sense of respectability and cor-
rectness that accompanies white women’s charitable work—
continues into the present. It should go without saying that
“America’s racial hierarchy continues to accord automatic benefits
and privileges to people who are born white and automatic disad-
vantages to others.”165 This section is concerned with the manifes-
tation of those benefits and privileges in modern child welfare
proceedings, in particular, in the work of CASAs: a group of pre-
dominately middle-class, white women engaged in charitable works
on behalf of poor children and children of color.
This section begins with an exploration of how the advocacy of
a CASA conflicts with bedrock principles of fairness in our legal
system, including notions of justiciability and standing, the role of
expert witnesses and opinion testimony, and “fair cross-section” re-
quirements for community participation. After establishing that
the CASA occupies a completely unique role in the American legal
tradition, one that flouts long-standing fairness rules, the paper
then looks at the kinds of things CASAs have said in actual child
welfare cases as examples of how that role shapes, and often mis-
shapes, the outcome of individual cases. Finally, this section con-
cludes by offering an explanation for how CASA programs have
164 PASCOE, supra note 98, at 186-87 (describing the transformation of Mission
Home work into government work and noting the reliance of Mission Homes on the
power of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children to remove Chinese
children from their parents and “assign” them to the Mission Home).
165 ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 230-31. In fact, as discussed above, child welfare is just
one of many areas where the presumption of respectability that accompanies white
women did not end in the Progressive Era, and indeed its roots go much further back.
See generally BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981). The
idealization of white women has roots in slavery, as does the need to rationalize the
differential treatment afforded to enslaved women. See generally Thavolia Glymph,
OUT OF THE HOUSE OF BONDAGE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PLANTATION HOUSE-
HOLD (2008). Cf. I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 869
(2013) (considering the differences in how white women and Black women are per-
ceived in a courtroom setting and discussing how rape shield laws, which are theoreti-
cally race neutral, in fact allow jurors to fill in the blanks about what they don’t know
about the victim’s sexual history with stereotypes that are likely to consider black wo-
men to be sexually promiscuous and white women to be morally pure).
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been allowed to flourish in a legal system that is ostensibly dedi-
cated to fairness and individual rights.
A. Conflict Between the Role of a CASA and Fairness Principles
As described above, the CASA’s role in court is a strange one.
First, as guardians ad litem, they decide what result they think is in
the best interest of the child, and direct the child’s representation
accordingly: Should the attorney join in the parent’s request for
return of the child, or oppose it? Should the attorney file a motion
to dismiss the petition, or put on evidence to support a finding of
neglect? Second, as per Soukup’s original concern,166 they report
to the court about the child’s circumstances and their own conclu-
sions regarding the best interests of the child—in many cases, the
very issue the court is trying to decide. In this dual role, CASAs
have no analogue within our system. Moreover, CASAs are—by de-
sign—lay volunteers with no real accountability. Because of these
unique factors, which are unlike any other legal party in our sys-
tem, there is good reason to question the impact of volunteer
CASAs on the overall fairness of the child protective proceedings
in which they appear.
First, and perhaps most fundamentally, there is the issue of
standing. By design, the CASA does not represent the child as an
attorney would. She does not have a client—she is the client, a
party to the case with all of the rights that entails, from notice and
the right to be heard to the right to be represented by counsel.167
CASAs have “standing” to participate as parties in child welfare
proceedings because state statutes give them standing.168 But the
CASA’s advocacy is effectively unmoored from any connection to
the actual child for whom she is supposed to speak. Ultimately, the
CASA speaks only for herself, although she will not live with any of
166 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. R
167 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(5) (2014) (“A guardian ad litem through
an attorney, or as otherwise authorized by the court, shall have the right to present
evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to be present at all hearings. A
guardian ad litem shall receive copies of all pleadings and other documents filed or
submitted to the court, and notice of all hearings according to court rules. The guard-
ian ad litem shall receive all notice contemplated for a parent or other party in all
proceedings under this chapter.”) See also supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text R
(discussing the various roles of CASAs in different jurisdictions).
168 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(1), (5) (2014) (requiring the appoint-
ment of a GAL for a child who is subject to a dependency action, unless a court for
good cause finds the appointment unnecessary, and granting that GAL all notice con-
templated for any other party, as well as the right to present evidence, examine wit-
nesses, and the right to be present at all hearings.)
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the consequences of the court’s decision. She need not advocate
for what the child wants, or what the child’s parents or therapist or
teachers or community think is best for the child.169 She advocates
for what she thinks is best for the child, based on her investigation
of the child’s circumstances and her own “common sense.”170 That
is precisely the job for which the CASA is recruited, not only some-
thing she is permitted to do but what she is expected to do.171
Given this, it is hard to see how reliance on CASAs in child
protective proceedings does not violate basic principles of jus-
ticiability, principles that are designed to promote fairness in our
legal system. A fundamental aspect of justiciability is that, for a
party to have standing, the party must have a stake in the outcome
of the case.172 Standing doctrines are designed to ensure fairness of
process because our legal system relies on the expectation that peo-
ple will effectively represent their own interests. After all, parties to
litigation typically stand to gain or lose something, and will invest
effort to serve their own ends. The Supreme Court has explained
that “concrete adverseness” between the parties is essential because
it “sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination[.]”173
Yet the CASA, by definition, has absolutely no stake in the pro-
ceeding. The CASA, unlike the agency or its employees, has no
accountability for the result of the case—she won’t lose her job or
be disciplined if she fails to build a proper case or to testify effec-
tively.174 And unlike the parent or the child herself, the CASA does
169 Piraino, supra note 64, at 66; see also Represented But Not Heard, supra note 57, at
100-08 (describing the common formulation of the child advocate as “champion” for
the child).
170 Piraino, supra note 64, at 67 (“[V]olunteers . . . are recruited not for their legal
knowledge but for their ‘unique qualities, community perspective, [and] common
sense approach . . . .’” (quoting NAT’L CASA ASS’N, COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING FOR THE
CASA/GAL 42 (1989)).
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (“As an aspect of jus-
ticiability, the standing question is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.”);
Branson v. Port of Seattle, 101 P.3d 67, 73-75 (Wash. 2004) (explaining that, in Wash-
ington state courts, a party has standing to pursue an action when she is within the
zone of interests protected by a statute and has suffered an injury in fact).
173 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013) (quoting Baker v. Carr,
339 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
174 A recent scandal involving Washington State’s Snohomish County Voluntary
Guardian Ad Litem (“VGAL”) program highlights the problems inherent in a system
that grants so much power to individuals who have so little accountability. The scan-
dal came to light because a VGAL lied to get access to a confidential defense attorney
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not have to live with the result of the proceeding: she does not
have to move homes or change schools or lose her connection to
her siblings or parents, or her connection to her own child. To
take the Court’s framing above, it is hard to see how a CASA’s in-
volvement could in fact “sharpen” the presentation of the actual
issues at stake in the child protective proceeding to which she is
assigned any more than any other randomly-selected individuals
could. Why, then, is the CASA not only allowed to participate—
given notice and a right to be heard throughout the case—but also
listened to so attentively? What is the CASA expected to add?
One way to answer this question is to turn, again, to Soukup’s
concern about information. As discussed above, the CASA is not
only expected to direct the child’s representation in their parents’
place, but also to investigate the child’s circumstances and report
to the court with her own conclusions regarding the child’s best
interests. In this role, the CASA is less of a guardian and more of a
witness, the designated “expert” on the child. If the CASA does her
job well—if she spends more than 3.22 hours on her case175—she
will be the one who speaks to all of the important people in the
child’s life, from the child’s parents, siblings, and foster parents to
her teachers, religious leaders, therapists, extended family, and the
listserv on which parents’ attorneys discuss parent defense strategies. The scandal
quickly escalated when the program sought to cover up that misconduct and submit-
ted false declarations. Ultimately, Snohomish County Judge Anita Farris made clear,
shocking findings of misconduct. Judge Farris found: “VGAL Cynthia Bemis’s first
sworn declaration to this Court about how she got on to the LISTSERV is perjury. I’ve
only used the ‘P word’ once in 23 years on this bench and it applies in this situation.
That declaration is filled with lies. The GAL who submitted it, Walker and the VGAL
Program that submitted it, had reason to know the witness was lying and they had the
ability to verify that many of those lies were lies, but instead chose to just submit a
lying witness’s declaration.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 8-9, In re Termination
of Alijanea Hayes, No. 14-7-00499-7 (Wash. Snohomish Cty. Super. Ct., Feb. 25, 2016).
Judge Farris also found that Snohomish County was not complying with their own
complaint procedures, which should allow litigants to raise questions about a VGAL’s
conduct, and that the complaint procedure was structured and applied in a way that
would fail to protect those who filed a grievance from retaliation by the VGAL. Id. at
19-21. Judge Farris’s clearest findings have to do with the program’s almost pathologi-
cal interest in maintaining the perception that they were good actors. Judge Farris
found that “[t]he VGAL Program was so vested in saying that a VGAL could never do
any wrong, it chose to just, like some ostrich, stick its head in the sand and submit
perjury rather than take the slightest effort to check obviously questionable facts.” Id.
at 84-85. “This program, in the way that it responded to this motion, has made it clear
that it does not believe that it is subject to any rules of the State of—in the law of the
State of Washington.” Id. at 130. Parents’ attorneys in that case went to extraordinary
lengths to expose the misconduct of the VGAL, and once exposed the misconduct
was obvious. But the difficulty those attorneys had piercing the layers of secrecy and
discretion built into the system ensures rulings like this are rare.
175 See EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 15-16.
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child herself.176 She can then share what she learned about the
child with the court, along with her opinion about the decision or
decisions that would be in the child’s best interests.
But the CASA program does not claim any particular exper-
tise. CASAs are not experts. Rather, they primarily offer what can
only be considered lay opinion testimony. The opinion the CASA
provides about the child’s best interests is not based on reliable
principles and methods, something ordinarily required of an ex-
pert opinion. In fact, there is probably no precise measure availa-
ble. What is in the best interests of any child is not an “objectively
determinable absolute,” but rather an “extremely malleable and
subjective standard”177 that contains countless predicate questions.
For example, making a best interests determination requires the
CASA to assign value to the parent-child relationship. How impor-
tant is a parent-child relationship, how strong is that relationship
here, and how strong is this child’s relationship with her extended
family, community, and Tribe? What do those people have to offer
this child? And how do we value her current caregivers? When as-
signing these values, what measure is the CASA expected to use? It
doesn’t end there. Best interests asks: Who is the best therapist for
this child, the one nearby, the one with better credentials, or the
one who shares the child’s culture? What is the best school for this
child, the one where she went and where her friends go, the one
closer to her mother’s new home, or the one closer to the foster
home? The questions go on and on.178 But the CASA is free to
offer her opinion, in the way an expert ordinarily would, even
when those opinions are based solely on her own impressions.
The CASA is not even limited to opining on matters related to
the child. As a party to the case, the CASA can ask the family court
176 Although, as discussed above, there is no obligation for a CASA to report to the
Court how many hours were spent on a particular report or what factors motivated
the CASA’s conclusion. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
177 Sinden, supra note 37, at 354; see also, e.g., Appell, supra note 12, at 608 (discuss-
ing the “subjectivity and indeterminacy” of the best interests standard); Annette R.
Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in
the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 74-82 (1995) (describing the
impossibility of ever determining a child’s “best interests” in any sort of definitive
way); Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 503 (1984) (“[T]he [best interests] test is so general and
vague that it provides no standard at all, and thus no guidance for decision-making.”).
178 Leah Hill has written on a similar issue of indeterminacy and bias in the use of
child welfare investigators to produce court-ordered reports for private custody cases
in New York City. See generally Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How
Bias Infiltrates the New York City Family Court - the Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527 (2007).
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to order the parents to engage in particular services, including
drug treatment or mental health counseling, and can demand re-
ports or information about a parent’s participation in those ser-
vices, including matters as personal as a domestic violence victim’s
trauma counseling.179 The CASA can then testify as to her opinions
about the parent’s progress in services, while having no obligation
to rely on professional judgments about that progress. For exam-
ple, a CASA may determine that although a parent is engaged in
drug treatment and giving consistent random negative urine
screens, the fact that the parent missed two appointments and did
not offer a reason suggests that the parent has relapsed. The court
then can accept and rely upon the CASA’s opinion even though it
is not directly related to the best interests of the child nor based on
any actual expertise in chemical dependency.
Frequently, the CASA’s testimony not only touches upon but
goes directly to the ultimate issue being litigated. “Best interests of
the child” is the standard at many points in a child protective pro-
ceeding, from certain visitation disputes180 to disposition after the
initial fact-finding181 and after the fact-finding regarding termina-
tion.182 If the best interest of the child is what the parties are litigat-
ing and what the court must decide, why is the CASA asked to offer
her opinion on the matter? By allowing the CASA to testify as to
the ultimate issue in the case—and by so often taking that testi-
mony to heart, as described by the former family court judges
quoted at the beginning of this article—the judge is essentially ab-
dicating her role to a volunteer who has been neither elected nor
appointed to fill it.
179 In the experience of the practitioners, while it is unclear how this is allowed
under the relevant statutes, this is a commonly accepted practice that some practition-
ers in King County have begun to push back against.
180 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(6) (2013) (“If the court has ordered a
child removed from his or her home pursuant to subsection (1)(b) of this section, the
court shall consider whether it is in a child’s best interest to be placed with, have
contact with, or have visits with siblings.”); Id. § 13.34.136(2)(b)(i)(A) (“If the parent
is incarcerated, the plan must address how the parent will participate in the case con-
ference and permanency planning meetings and, where possible, must include treat-
ment that reflects the resources available at the facility where the parent is confined.
The plan must provide for visitation opportunities, unless visitation is not in the best
interests of the child.”).
181 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1052 (2016).
182 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.132
(2013). Although the Washington Statute does not define the “best interests” inquiry
as a dispositional issue, case law has made clear that it is a separate inquiry from
whether the statutory termination elements have been met. In re Welfare of A.B., 232
P.3d 1104, 1113 (Wash. 2010) (describing the “best interests” inquiry as the second
step in a two-step process).
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What happens where “best interests” is not the standard—for
example, at fact-finding, where the court must determine whether
the state has put forth sufficient evidence to establish by a prepon-
derance that the parent abused or neglected the child? At that
point in the proceeding, it does not seem to violate any fundamen-
tal principles of the adversary system to permit a CASA to testify
that a finding of neglect should be entered because such a finding
is “in the best interests” of the child—that is not the ultimate issue,
at least not yet. But is it at all relevant? And even if it were relevant,
isn’t it extremely prejudicial? How is the court supposed to weigh a
close case fairly where, despite the state potentially having failed to
establish neglect under the law, the individual assigned to speak
“for” the child has testified that a finding of neglect would benefit
that child? Even if, in her role as a guardian ad litem, a CASA is
supposed to determine what legal position is in the child’s best in-
terests at every step in the case in order to direct the child’s repre-
sentation—itself a questionable prospect, as discussed above—
allowing the CASA to testify about that determination distorts the
legal process, regardless of whether that is the question at issue in
the proceeding or not.
A different possible justification for the CASA’s anomalous
role in our legal system could be the one implicitly given by the
national CASA organization itself, when describing the qualities for
which CASA volunteers are recruited: the CASA is there to bring a
“community perspective” into the courtroom.183 This is something
we value—this is the aspect of fairness represented by the Sixth
and Seventh Amendments—and it would seem particularly impor-
tant in child welfare proceedings, given the cultural aspect of
nearly all parenting standards.
Yet when we want to bring a “community perspective” into
court proceedings, we do it by means of a jury—something that is
rare in child welfare proceedings184—and we do it according to
183 See Piraino, supra note 64, at 67.
184 “Jury trials are not constitutionally required in termination of parental rights
cases. However, five states guarantee the right to a jury trial in involuntary termina-
tion proceedings. In addition, Arizona allowed jury trials for a three-year experimen-
tation period, although it does not currently allow jury trials in termination of
parental rights proceedings. Every other state specifically prohibits jury trials in termi-
nation of parental rights cases.” Cary Bloodworth, Comment, Judge or Jury? How Best to
Preserve Due Process in Wisconsin Termination of Parental Rights Cases, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
1039, 1041 (2013) (footnotes omitted). See generally Melissa L. Breger, Introducing the
Construct of the Jury into Family Violence Proceedings and Family Court Jurisprudence, 13
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 36 (2006) (examining the history of the jury trial in relation
to family court proceedings and recommending that jury trials be an option in “the
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carefully calibrated procedures, in order to enhance the likelihood
that the jury will fairly represent the community: parties cannot use
race as a basis for striking jurors;185 the jury pool must represent a
“fair cross-section” of the community;186 and, although a jury of six
members is sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements, a jury
of five is unconstitutional, because “any further reduction . . . pro-
motes inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking . . . and . . .
prevents juries from truly representing their communities[.]”187
Even if CASAs did provide the “community perspective” for
which the national CASA organization says they are recruited,188
that perspective is offered in a way that violates the first principles
of community participation in our legal system. If the “community
perspective” is offered by a single individual—the CASA—it can
never represent the community. The CASA, no matter how con-
nected to “the community” she is, is not a “fair cross-section” of
that community. She is one person, representing her race and gen-
der alone.
In fact, the situation is far worse than that. As discussed above,
most CASAs are from an entirely different community than the chil-
dren for whom they are supposed to speak and the parents whose
voices they replace. Eighty-to-ninety percent of CASAs are white,189
and the majority are middle-to-upper class and educated,190 while
the children for whom they advocate are overwhelmingly low-in-
come and disproportionately Black or Native American.191 CASAs
adjudicative portion of family offense proceedings and child protective proceedings
addressing allegations of family violence”).
185 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (“By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the ra-
cially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the man-
date of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice. In view of the
heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice sys-
tem and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified
from jury service because of his race.”).
186 Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn
from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community); Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (“[T]he goal of the Sixth Amendment is representation of a fair
cross section of the community on the petit jury . . . .”); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975).
187 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
188 Piraino, supra note 64, at 67 (“[V]olunteers . . . are recruited not for their legal
knowledge but for their ‘unique qualities, community perspective, [and] common
sense approach . . . .’” (quoting NAT’L CASA ASS’N, COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING FOR THE
CASA/GAL 42 (1989))).
189 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. R
190 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. R
191 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. R
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are pretty much the polar opposite of “community” representation,
at least if one assumes that the community to be represented is the
community whose lives and rights are at stake in the legal
proceeding.
Parents in child welfare cases sense this lack of legitimacy
when they ask their attorneys “why does that woman get a say in the
outcome of my case?” The answer they are likely to get will be un-
satisfying: because that’s just the way it is. Thereafter, parents are
free to fill in the blank with their own experiences of racism and
discrimination to explain why a white woman of means is ap-
pointed by the court to speak for their child. Considering the his-
tory of child welfare, and the long-standing role white women have
played in the destruction of poor families of color, parents are
right to be skeptical about the benefits of this charity.
B. The Power of the CASA
The disconnect between the backgrounds of most CASAs and
the children for whom they speak creates questionable advocacy on
the part of many CASAs. CASAs in King County, Washington, have
expressed concerns about reunification based on the location of a
parent’s new home, because it is on a “dark street” or because it is
in Federal Way, a low-income neighborhood outside of Seattle.192
According to one practitioner familiar with the case one CASA tes-
tified at a trial to terminate the parental rights of a father who had
purchased an RV as a home for himself, his partner, and eventually
his children to live in, that she “hardly considered an RV a stable
environment.” The CASA found the father’s choice to purchase
the RV, when he could have used the money for something else, to
be a parental deficiency. Yet before the father bought the RV, he
was camping on the street or living in shelters.
In another case, without ever having met one of the four chil-
dren for whom she was speaking, another CASA advocated that de-
pendency should be established for four Native American siblings
because, in the CASA’s opinion, the mother could “benefit” from
“services,” though the CASA’s report did not indicate what services
she thought were needed. Another testified at a termination trial
that, among other things, the parents put too much Desitin on
their child’s diaper rash. A third expressed “concern” about
whether the Black mother in her case was sufficiently bonded to
daughter when the mother allowed the girl to unbuckle herself
192 All documents regarding cases discussed in this section are on file with the
authors.
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from her car seat and get out of the car on her own rather than
doing these things for her.
The situation is even more problematic when the child in
question has been removed from her home and placed in a foster
home that is more racially and economically familiar to the CASA,
as the CASA is then likely to identify with the foster parents and
base her assessment of the child’s best interests at least in part on
the instinct that the foster home is simply “better” than the child’s
own home. For example, one CASA expressed concern about re-
turning two girls to their single Black father—who had completed
every service asked of him and obtained a sought-after spot in a
transitional housing program for himself and his daughters—be-
cause the move would be disruptive to the “quality of life” the girls
were experiencing in their two-parent white foster home. And the
same CASA who testified about the RV also repeatedly compared
that father’s home in the RV to the foster home, indicating that the
foster home had “lots of toys” and that they “read to [the child].”193
Although racial bias is rarely the topic of explicit discussion in
dependency court, it often lies just below the surface and at times
becomes painfully obvious. One CASA volunteer, during the
course of a dependency case, made an unannounced visit to the
mother’s home and found a man in the home; it later turned out
that the man was not allowed to be there, although the volunteer
didn’t know who the man was at the time of her visit. The child was
removed from the mother and the case eventually went to a termi-
nation trial. At trial, the volunteer testified that the unapproved
individual was a Black man approximately in his 20s or early 30s,
and that when she encountered him he was wearing only a pair of
shorts. The volunteer then testified that upon seeing him, she
feared for her life and that she believed he could have been carry-
ing a weapon.
In all of the examples just discussed, the dependency court
gave great weight to the CASA’s recommendation. For example, in
the case in which the mother failed to unbuckle her daughter’s
seatbelt for her, the judicial officer was sufficiently concerned by
the CASA report that she granted the CASA’s request for a new,
more searching evaluation of the family. The evaluation ultimately
recommended that the case be dismissed. And even a judge who
ultimately ruled against the CASA’s position—dismissing the de-
193 This same CASA also testified that, although she did not know whether the De-
partment had actually offered services to the parents, it was her opinion that the par-
ents did not comply with the services and that termination was therefore appropriate.
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pendency petition against the mother the CASA believed would
“benefit” from unspecified services—nevertheless took time before
ruling to praise the CASA’s “good intentions” in advocating as she
did.
This is not surprising. As described above, in a proceeding
without many of the “standard trappings of the traditional adver-
sarial model of dispute resolution[,]”194 the CASA is a “neutral”
anomaly—a party with a right to be heard but no stake in the case.
More to the point, however, the CASA’s seeming neutrality gives
her an enhanced voice in comparison to the two parties who are
not neutral, who do have a stake in the outcome, and whose posi-
tions are therefore presumed to be less trustworthy. Not only will
the judge pay particular heed to what the CASA has to say, but,
often, the other parties are reluctant to “go all out” in their opposi-
tion to her, lest they come off as too aggressive. After all, the CASA
is a volunteer, a “friend of the court,” appearing in the case out of
the goodness of her heart and speaking for the best interests of the
child rather than for her own benefit; she does not deserve to be
“attacked.”195
Of course, CASAs do sometimes support expanded parental
visitation or parent-child reunification, and there are CASAs who
make a real effort to understand the families and communities of
the children for whom they are advocating. But even if those
CASAs were the norm, it would not eliminate broader issues stem-
ming from the very fact of a CASA’s role in the first place. Because
CASAs have the authority to weigh in at all stages in the case, the
legal standards are so vague, guidelines for CASAs are practically
nonexistent, and because CASAs are regularly granted deference
by the courts, parents and their attorneys have to constantly posi-
tion their litigation with an eye on the CASA.196
The CASA presents an extremely challenging set of choices for
the parent in a child welfare case who is fighting to keep their fam-
ily together. For each case, the attorney and client need to size up
the individual CASA assigned: What is her position likely to be?
194 See Sinden, supra note 37, at 348 (explaining that the proceedings are con-
ducted at an intermediate level of formality but that parents lack many of the proce-
dural rights which criminal defendants enjoy).
195 Cf. id. at 354 (“Mothers are supposed to be nurturing, loving, and above all
protective of their children. Conflict is viewed as harmful to the child, and therefore
the mother accused of child abuse who creates conflict . . . harms her child a second
time.”).
196 Cf. Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990,
2006 (1995) (discussing the importance of getting the child’s law guardian “on one’s
side” when representing a parent in family court).
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How will she view the parent? The attorney and client need to de-
cide whether it makes sense to cooperate with the CASA and try
and “sell” the parent to the CASA as a good parent, or keep the
CASA at bay until the parent can get on stronger footing. The at-
torney and client need to decide whether the particular CASA is
likely to understand the complexities of a parent’s life or whether
it is better to keep her in the dark entirely. Attorneys and clients
wonder: Is this a CASA that can be educated about race and pov-
erty, mental illness or drug addiction? Should the parent disclose
facts about trauma she has suffered in her own life? Or will the
CASA take any concession of weakness to use later at a termination
trial?
Keeping the CASA at arms-length—refusing to speak to her or
sign releases of information for her to speak with “service provid-
ers”—has risks because the CASA is likely to be resentful and dis-
trustful of the parent as a result. She will then almost certainly
oppose whatever relief the parent seeks in the future (e.g., addi-
tional visitation, a decreased level of supervision), but on the plus
side she may have less information to use in support of her opposi-
tion. At the same time, openly communicating with the CASA has
significant risks as well, not unlike talking to the police in a crimi-
nal case—everything you say can and will be held against you—
except the parent has no right to a warning in advance.
C. Structural Racism and Volunteer CASA Programs
So, if CASA programs really are set up so as to undermine es-
tablished principles of fairness, why are they not just tolerated, but
praised? If CASAs have inordinate influence—swaying decisions
and forcing the other parties to shape their strategies with the
CASA in mind—why have CASA programs failed to engender more
scrutiny or suspicion? The answer folds back to the history of our
child welfare system: CASA programs draw on traditions that feel
comfortable, traditions that enhance rather than challenge ex-
isting structures of power.
A CASA need not establish her expertise on the best interests
of a child because, as a white, middle-class woman, she benefits
from the assumption that such expertise is one of her natural at-
tributes. Her views on parenting are presumed to be correct, so
there is little reason to doubt her ability to pass quality judgment
on matters of parenting and children.197 In addition, the CASA
197 See supra Section II. For an important discussion of the ways in which this coun-
try views—and values—white and Black motherhood differently, see Odeana R. Neal,
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benefits from the assumption that because her work is charitable,
there is no need to examine her motives. Her good intentions
make her opinions more valuable, even as they shield her work
from scrutiny. The benefits she receives from her participation in
the system are not the subject of the case and, therefore, her rea-
sons for taking up this charitable work will go unquestioned. The
CASA need not justify her seat at the table—her standing—be-
cause courts have long relied on the opinions of white women
when making decisions about the lives of poor children.198 That is
to say, the CASA is valued for the reasons the charitable class has
historically been valued.
And while the CASA’s formal role in the courtroom is one of
“neutrality”—simply looking out for the interests of the child and
assisting the court in making an informed decision—she does not
have a neutral perspective. Like the early child savers, the CASA
necessarily views the best interests of “her” child through the lens
of her own experience, an experience that is nearly always differ-
ent than the experiences of the child for whom she speaks. The
CASAs described above—the ones who were concerned about chil-
dren living with their father in an RV or unbuckling their own car
seats or having to leave their foster home to reunite with their fa-
ther in transitional housing—had those concerns because what
they saw happening did not match their understanding of a proper
middle-class childhood. Yet, the job of the dependency court is not
to give every child a proper middle-class childhood, nor should it
be. The job of the dependency court is to determine when state
intervention in the family is necessary to prevent serious harm to
the child.199 If we wanted to give every child a middle-class child-
hood, there would be much better—and more constitutional—
ways to do it than by the removal and redistribution of children via
the child welfare system.
As with the child-saving movements of decades past, the racial
aspect of this system is not accidental, nor a mere subtext. Rather,
the violence imposed by the child welfare system is a violence spe-
cifically imposed on low-income families of color as well as white
Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental Rights, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 61 (1995); see also Roberts, supra note 94; Roberts, Prison, supra note 14, at 1486.
198 See supra Section II.
199 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (parents are constitutionally entitled
to a hearing on their fitness); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (1970) (“[The Family
Court Act] is designed to provide a due process of law for determining when the state,
through its family court, may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a
child so that his needs are properly met.”).
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families who, because of their poverty, are unable to meet middle-
class standards of living and parenting.200 The choice to not only
rely on the assistance of a CASA to provide information about the
child’s best interests during the course of a child protective pro-
ceeding but to actually make her a party to the case, with represen-
tation and a right to be heard, is a choice that mirrors and
enhances existing structures of white supremacy. A CASA’s power
to speak for the child is not merely a net gain in authority to the
CASA herself, it is a net loss to the parent whose fundamental
rights are at stake and whose family is threatened with permanent
destruction. It is also a net loss to the child, who may or may not
have their stated interests represented or advocated for in court.
In fact, the choice to rely on a system of volunteer, middle-
aged white women to give direction in child welfare cases illumi-
nates the racist underpinnings of the entire system. Ultimately,
CASAs are afforded so much deference because the system views
them as superior. A CASA is entitled to deference precisely because
she has nothing in common with the poor families of color whose
children are removed. And so it is with no irony, or historical per-
spective, that the child welfare system offers the CASA as an expert
on other people’s children and the lone spokesperson for the
“community’s” perspective on parenting.
The problem of the CASA is the problem of family court.
There are three primary ways in which racism is embedded in the
child welfare system. First, as discussed above, the discretionary
standards and the need for constant judgment calls allow racial
and class bias on the part of decision-makers all the way through
the life of a child protective case, from the initial call that starts an
investigation to the decision whether it is in a child’s best interests
to give his parent a “second chance” to regain her rights with a
suspended judgment after a termination trial.201 Second, the inter-
relation between the child welfare system and other systems that
affect the lives of low-income families and families of color—in-
cluding the criminal justice system, employment, and housing—
means that the racism present in those areas comes already “baked
in” to the standards employed by child protective workers and fam-
200 See generally Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 318-19 (2014) (describing the ways in which the
relationship between social support and poor communities is “hyperregulatory,” in
that “its mechanisms are targeted by race, class, gender, and place to exert punitive
social control over poor, African-American women, their families, and their
communities”).
201 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. R
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ily courts: which parents are most likely to have a criminal record,
to be unemployed or homeless, or to live in substandard
housing?202
Finally—and this is what an analysis of the role of the CASA
helps show us—conscious or not, racism is a key part of what allows
those working in the system to see what they are doing as fair and
just, despite all indications to the contrary. As Robert Cover has
famously observed, while “[l]egal interpretive acts signal and occa-
sion the imposition of violence upon others[,]”203 our “evolution-
ary, psychological, cultural, and moral” inhibition against the
infliction of pain on others requires that this exercise of violence
be tied up with “cues that operate to by-pass or suppress the
psycho-social mechanisms that usually inhibit people’s actions caus-
ing pain and death.”204 In the child welfare system, these cues are
present in the system’s emphasis on “helping,” “fixing,” and provid-
ing needed “services” to poor families. By framing the work of
child welfare in the language of helping and fixing, rather than in
the language of rights, the value of those legal standards which do
exist is further diluted, and the pain experienced by families is ob-
scured. This framing—the same framing that has been used since
the mid-nineteenth-century advent of the child-saving movement—
obscures the violence actually dealt by the system, and “suppresses
rights talk,”205 creating pressure on parents to work within the sys-
tem, to “comply,” 206 and to be grateful for the assistance of the
modern “charitable class.”207
But these cues wouldn’t work—they would not be able to ob-
scure the real harm that is caused to so many families by the opera-
tion of the child welfare system—if not for the underlying
202 See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text. R
203 Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
204 Id. at 1613.
205 Sinden, supra note 37, at 350.
206 Id. at 353.
207 Jane Spinak describes this phenomenon well: “Individuals and families whose
conduct is regulated by the state are often expected to act in prescribed ways. Welfare
recipients, for example, are supposed to be grateful for their income despite Supreme
Court decisions which pronounce such payments to be an entitlement. Biological par-
ents who are forced by circumstance or unfitness to place their children in foster care
are then required, while the state acts as guardian, to solve their problems of poverty,
illiteracy, homelessness or drug addiction while developing a thorough understand-
ing of child development and family dynamics. They are expected, furthermore, to be
resolute, even cheerful, when they are permitted to visit their children for an hour
every other week and to troop off steadfastly to any and all programs that their
caseworker has identified as necessary for return of the children.” Spinak, supra note
196, at 2000.
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assumption that the families involved in the system are in fact fami-
lies that are deficient and need help, and the corresponding as-
sumption that those in the child welfare system are the ones who
are best positioned to provide that help. And we would not make
either of those assumptions—we would not be so comfortable
thinking that low-income Black and Native children lack “impor-
tant people” in their lives—but for the powerful racism and clas-
sism that permeates our society and devalues families of color. As
Dorothy Roberts explains, “The cherished icon of the mother nur-
turing her child is . . . imbued with racial imagery . . . . ‘Americans
expect[ ] Black mothers to look like Aunt Jemima, working in
somebody else’s kitchen. American culture reveres no Black ma-
donna; it upholds no popular image of a Black mother nurturing
her child.’” 208 If it did, it would be obvious that what we are doing
in dependency court each day is the furthest thing from kindness.
CONCLUSION
This paper need not define what child representation should
look like in order to argue what it should not. The ongoing, na-
tionwide experiment with volunteer CASAs has caused some of the
most troubling parts of child welfare’s history to resurface. Consid-
ering these programs in the clear light of day reveals that they de-
prive families of a fair and neutral adjudication of their child
welfare case. CASAs are impermissibly allowed to define and judge
families against the benchmark of a white middle-class childhood,
or whatever arbitrarily determined benchmark the CASA brings
with her into the courtroom. And while CASAs are given enormous
power to speak “for” children, their claim to authority is based on
little more than race-, class-, and gender-based assumptions about
middle-class white women’s inherent ability to recognize good and
bad forms of parenting. A critical examination of CASA programs
suggests we adopt a deep skepticism when the views of privileged
white people are allowed to dominate over the views of the families
most directly impacted by the system, however well-intentioned
those voices seem.
In fact, there are a myriad of other solutions which could have
been adopted to address Judge Soukup’s original concern that he
lacked information about children in child welfare cases. The most
obvious would be to support and professionalize the role of the
assigned social worker from the children’s services agency, to adopt
208 Roberts, supra note 94, at 146.
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low caseload standards, and to give those individuals the resources
they need to fully inform the court. Providing information about a
family, whether good or bad, is their role and the law already re-
quires them to prepare reports to court about the parents and chil-
dren. Judges similarly have the power to hold those social workers
accountable for failing to provide the necessary investigation, to
schedule new court dates, ask for more detailed reports, or hold
them in contempt, if necessary. In fact, if one views the resources
of the child welfare system as a limited pool, one could argue that
the CASA program is actually pulling money out of the system that
could otherwise be directed to improving the social work itself.
And what about the need for someone to advocate for the best
interests of the child? First off, there is no reason why a parent in a
dependency case, who is statistically likely to reunify with their
child eventually, could not retain this power—a power to which
they are constitutionally entitled—subject to the decisions of the
court and ongoing supervision of the child welfare agency. Involv-
ing the parent in decision-making about her child furthers the goal
of the dependency system to minimize intrusion into private family
life and prepare the family for a safe reunification. Allowing par-
ents to continue to speak for the best interests of their children
would recognize that reunification is possible in the majority of
cases and would send a message to parents that, even though they
may have lost custody of their child, the legal system continues to
see their value as parents.
Such an argument may seem absurd to those who work
outside the field of family defense, but it is less absurd in reality.
Parents may, by virtue of their poverty, suffer from homelessness,
instability, drug addiction, depression, or anxiety; they may be vic-
tims of domestic violence; or they may suffer from PTSD. As a re-
sult, they may not be able to offer a safe home for their families.
Our society has elected to prosecute those parents for their defi-
ciencies and to pay other people to care for their children. But
whatever the parent’s deficiencies may be, the mere fact of poverty,
illness, or a drug addiction does not mean that a parent cannot
provide meaningful input about the child’s needs and interests.
Many upper-middle-class parents have made appropriate decisions
for their children despite an ongoing addiction to narcotics or al-
cohol, and many low-income parents could do the same.
But, sadly, there are cases in which parents do not participate
in the dependency case and are therefore not available to advocate
for their child. Also, in a small minority of cases, the dependency
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 41 Side A      02/22/2017   14:25:05
38634-cny_20-1 offprints  Sheet No. 41 Side A      02/22/2017   14:25:05
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\20-1\CNY102.txt unknown Seq: 53  1-FEB-17 11:25
2016] HOWEVER KINDLY INTENTIONED 75
charges stem from allegations of serious physical or sexual abuse
and criminal protection orders may prohibit contact or informa-
tion-sharing between parent and child. In those cases, some might
suggest that the need for a CASA is strongest, in order to be, as
Judge Edwards suggested, an “important person” in the child’s life.
But that assumes that the child comes from a vacuum and has no
important people in her life already, no aunts or uncles, teachers,
neighbors, friends, friends’ parents, pastors, grandparents, or
others who have the child’s interests at heart.
The vast majority of children have a community available to
them beyond their parents. Why could those people not be invited
to participate in decision-making regarding the child? Assuming
for the sake of argument that there is a need for someone other
than the social worker, the parent, or—assuming the child is old
enough to develop a stated interest—the child to speak for the
child, it would be worthwhile to explore options that do not rely on
the input of strangers, however well-meaning those strangers may
be. It would further the child’s sense of connectedness and com-
munity to identify an advocate or advocates who already know the
child and family who can offer an informed perspective on her
interests.
Whatever system a jurisdiction ultimately adopts, whether it is
one of these suggestions or something else, the lessons of the
CASA experiment offer one clear message: the integrity of the le-
gal system is compromised when the law invites voices of privilege
to dominate. Given our nation’s long struggle with racial discrimi-
nation, it is particularly troubling to allow the voices of white peo-
ple to speak loudest in a system disproportionately focused on
families of color. And given the racism and the layers of discretion
already built into the system, the fairness of the child welfare sys-
tem will inevitably suffer when even well-meaning attempts to help
children obtain a “better” childhood are allowed to take prece-
dence over judicial decision-making based on established legal
rules and standards.
Assuming that CASAs mean well, assuming their kind inten-
tions, should not blind observers to the racial oppression inherent
in the child welfare system. Parents in child welfare proceedings
are not fooled. A legal system that allows middle-class white women
to speak for the children of poor families of color is not hiding its
bias if you only take a moment to look behind the “therapeutic”
veneer. This exercise of white supremacy is out in the open, obvi-
ous, direct. It is a part of the case—a party to the case. Allowing
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CASAs to stand in the place of child-welfare-involved parents and
speak for child-welfare-involved children is to take the structural
racism underlying the child welfare system and give it a seat at the
table. It is to ask it directly what it thinks is best.
